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Abstract
This Article reviews the principal means of IFI peace-building and offers several proposals
to enhance the effectiveness of those means. Focusing primarily on the World Bank Group and
the IMF, this Article posits that profound changes are necessary if the Bretton Woods institutions
are to realize their potential as leaders in the international peace process. Part I of this Article
provides a brief historical account of the Bretton Woods institutions and discusses relevant pro-
visions in their charters, elucidating the factors that have traditionally prevented IFI participation
in peace operations. Part II describes and reviews IFI post-conflict reconstruction programs in
the post-Cold War era, devoting particular attention to the 1997 World Bank initiative entitled
A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (the “Framework”).
Part III reviews conditionality, as exercised by the IMF and the World Bank Group, and discusses
its potential as a tool for peace-building. Finally, Part IV offers proposals for greater IFI impact
and efficiency in peace operations, including a reinterpretation of the concept of ”political” ac-
tion as employed in the IBRD, IDA, and regional bank Articles of Agreement; a more flexible
and country-specific approach to conditionality; and a greater coordination with relief agencies,
non-governmental organizations, bilateral donors, and other U.N. organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the developing world has
witnessed a dramatic proliferation of civil and international mili-
tary conflict. Among the poorest twenty nations in the world,
fifteen have endured military conflict in the past decade.' Over
fifty nations have experienced serious incidences of conflict,
either international or civil in nature, and virtually every low-in-
come nation has either undergone deadly conflict or shared a
border with a nation at war.2 Peace operations have thus be-
come a preeminent concern for the United Nations and the
greater international community, occupying ever-greater
amounts of finances, technology, and human resources.3
Ironically, peacekeeping functions were not foreseen when
the United Nations Charter was drafted in 1945, 4 and during
* Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell; J.D., 1998, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1995,
Harvard College. The author would like to thank Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard
Law School for his valuable comments.
1. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, A FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK INVOLVEMENT IN POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION at i (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD
BANK RECONSTRUCTION].
2. Id. at ii. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD,"
"World Bank," or "Bank") also asserts that "there have been more conflicts in the past
20 years than at any other time this century." See Graham Bowley, Prevention Is Better
than Cure, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 27, 1996, at 25; The World Bank Group, Support-
ing Peace: The World Bank's Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (visited Apr. 1, 1998)
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extrd/backgrd/ibrd/peace.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
3. In the 1995, the international community spent over US$3 billion on
peacekeeping operations conducted in sixteen nations. Bowley, supra note 2, at 25.
Total outlays on Bosnia and Herzegovina alone have amounted to approximately
US$15 billion. SeeJohn Stremlau & Francisco Sagasti, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the
World Bank Have a Role?, Report for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict (1998), ch. 1, 23 (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/
worldbank/world.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
4. In fact, peacekeeping operations were of dubious legality for many years be-
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the Cold War years, only thirteen U.N. peacekeeping operations
were conducted, twelve of which related to European
decolonizations. 5  Such initiatives were limited to "classical
peacekeeping," which comprised monitoring and enforcing
cease-fires, patrolling hostile frontier lines, and interposing be-
tween belligerents.6 Since the end of the Cold War, however,
the nature of peace operations has profoundly changed.7
Emerging-world conflicts have become more profuse and more
complex, while the U.N. collective security system has realized
enhanced freedom of action no longer encumbered by the bipo-
lar geopolitical framework of the Cold War era.8
The result has been a drastic expansion in the number, size,
and scope of peace operations. Since 1989, twenty-five new
peacekeeping forces have been created.9 In addition, peace op-
erations have developed far beyond the bounds of "classical
peacekeeping," involving an ever-broader range of international
participants and activities.1t
In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali divided post-Cold War peace operations into
three major categories: peacekeeping, peace-making, and
peace-building."1  Boutros-Ghali defined peace-building, the
cause the U.N. Charter provisions were not drafted in their anticipation. Chapter VI of
the U.N. Charter authorizes the United Nations to seek solutions to a conflict between
consenting parties. See U.N. CHARTER ch. VI. Chapter VII allows the United Nations to
restore international peace and security via military action if the U.N. Security Council
deems such action necessary. Id. ch. VII. Peacekeeping was viewed as intermediate
between these two forms of action and was therefore referred to as "Chapter 61/2 opera-
tions." Adam Roberts, The Crisis in U.N. Peacekeeping, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS 297,
298 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1996).
5. Roberts, supra note 4, at 298.
6. Mario Zucconi, Extended Peacekeeping: Planning and Technical Requirements: 98
Lessons ftom Recent Operations, in U.S. CONGRESS, OF1ICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE INTERNATIONA L PEACE OPERATIONS: WORKSHOP
PROCEEDINGS 41, 43 (1995).
7. See generally STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN
LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR, ch. 1 (1996).
8. Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions After
the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L LJ. 443 (1997); Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1,
46.
9. RATNER, supra note 7, at 1.
10. John A. MacInnis, The Role of the United Nations with Respect to the Means for Ac-
complishing the Maintenance and Restoration of Peace, 26 GA.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 81 (1996).
11. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992 Agenda for Peace, U.N.
Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992). Despite the definition provided, there is no
consensus among scholars as to the distinguishing features of peacekeeping, peace-
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most novel and far-reaching of the operational prongs, as "ef-
forts to identify and support structures which will tend to consol-
idate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being
among people."' 2 His vision for a new breadth of international
intervention has been realized in recent years as the concept of
peace-building has been increasingly accepted and put into prac-
tice.13
Among the most important peace-building activities are
those conducted by the international financial institutions
("IFIs" or "Bretton Woods institutions"), including the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD,"
"World Bank," or "Bank"), the International Monetary Fund
("IMF" or "Fund"), the International Development Association
("IDA"), and regional development banks. In recent years, the
IFIs have diverged from traditional practices to realize a height-
ened participation in peace operations.' 4 Their increased in-
volvement is premised upon two related theories. First, it is
widely believed that most of the conflicts in the post-Cold War
era have been linked to, if not the direct result of, economic
plight and concomitant political instability.'" Second, it is com-
making, and peace-building. RATNER, supra note 7, at 16. John Linarelli argues that
they "can be viewed as part of a seamless web of activities designed to create the condi-
tions for long-term peace." Although peace-building is often associated with post-con-
flict reconstruction and development, Linarelli argues that it should occur both prior
to and after conflict. John Linarelli, Peace-Building, 24 DENV. INT'L J. L. & POL'v 253,
254 (1996).
12. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 11. Boutros-Ghali gave an analogous definition of
peace-building in his 1994 Agenda for Development. See An Agenda for Development:
Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 91, U.N. Doc. A/
48/935 (1994). For further discussion of the concept of peace-building, see Fen Osler
Hampson, Can Peacebuilding Work?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 701, 701-05 (1997).
13. This Article will define international financial institution ("1F") action taken
both before and after conflict occurs as part of a peace-building process encompassing
both preventative and curative measures.
14. Peace-building initiatives, by the international financial institutions ("IFIs" or
"Bretton Woods institutions") and others, have been in the ascendant in recent years.
See Reworking the U.N., ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 17. An example of the heightened
IFI participation in peace-building is the newly-implemented ten-year, US$25 billion
program for Africa, led by the United Nations and the World Bank, to promote peace,
education, health, and good governance. The Bank has agreed to mobilize the neces-
sary funding. U.N. to Launch 10-Year Program to Aid Africa, XINHUA NEwswiRE, Mar. 8,
1996; U.N. Will Provide Billions for African Development, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at
A16; see Bowley, supra note 2, at 25.
15. See NICOLE BALL, MAKING PEACE WoPRK: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DE-
VELOPMENT COMMUNITY 104 (1996).
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monly held that building lasting peace requires more than
peacekeeping and relief aid; it requires sustainable economic de-
velopment. 16
The theory that economic development is critical to the
maintenance of peace drove the 1944 creation of the IFIs at
Bretton Woods.' 7 Historical factors and interpretations of key
charter provisions, however, led the IFIs away from direct in-
volvement in peace operations." Only in recent years, with the
enhanced freedom of action afforded by the post-Cold War
era,' 9 have the Bretton Woods institutions returned to a greater
focus upon and participation in peace operations.
There are two major means by which the Bretton Woods
institutions have sought to build peace, both of which emanate
from their abundant financial power. Those means correspond
conceptually to prevention and cure, addressing deadly conflict
from ex ante and ex post perspectives. The ex ante approach is
based on conditionality, a method that premises financial assist-
ance on a recipient nation's compliance with certain measures.
When those measures are designed to effect lasting peace, condi-
tionality functions as a device for conflict prevention. The ex post
approach to conflict is based on reconstruction, the process of
transforming a war-torn society into one with the social, political,
and economic stability necessary to embark on a sustainable pro-
gram of development, and eventually self-reliance. Although re-
construction has been the predominant focus of IFI initiatives
thus far, both means are potentially utile in the peace-building
process.2 °
16. Linarelli, supra note 11, at 253-54. Steven Holtzman, a World Bank social sci-
entist who directs the IBRD Post-Conflict Unit, asserted that: "Humanitarian aid with-
out sustainable paths forward represents an increasingly expensive Band-aid" and
peacekeeping operations are "nothing more than a security framework which cannot
alone facilitate a transition out of war." See Bowley, supra note 2, at 25.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. For a discussion of the historical factors that led to the relative lack of IFI
involvement in peace operations, see infra Part II.
19. See generally Orford, supra note 8.
20. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has advocated the use of both reconstruc-
tion and conditionality as peace-building tools. Report by Annan Explores Causes, Cures of
Africa Conflict, AER. NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 16, 1998. The Carngeie Commission on the
Prevention of Deadly Conflict likewise recommends that IFIs take both forms of action.
See Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Con-
flict: Final Report: Chapter 6 (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/
rept97/text/Chapt6.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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Despite the recent increase in IFI peace-building projects,
significant obstacles continue to impede their effectiveness. The
charters of the IBRD, IDA, and regional banks, which prohibit
certain types of "political" activity, remain the foremost impedi-
ments to constructive involvement.21 Economic concerns, par-
ticularly the management of IFI credit risk, also pose challenges,
as do organizational efficiency and expertise within the IFIs.
Furthermore, institutional divisions within the United Nations
present challenges to integration and cooperation.22 All such
obstacles reduce the promptness and efficacy of IFI peace-build-
ing initiatives.
This Article reviews the principal means of IFI peace-build-
ing and offers several proposals to enhance the effectiveness of
those means. Focusing primarily on the World Bank Group 23
and the IMF, this Article posits that profound changes are neces-
sary if the Bretton Woods institutions are to realize their poten-
tial as leaders in the international peace process. Part I of this
Article provides a brief historical account of the Bretton Woods
institutions and discusses relevant provisions in their charters,
elucidating the factors that have traditionally prevented IFI par-
ticipation in peace operations. Part II describes and reviews IFI
post-conflict reconstruction programs in the post-Cold War era,
devoting particular attention to the 1997 World Bank initiative
entitled A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Re-
construction (the "Framework") .24 Part III reviews conditionality,
as exercised by the IMF and the World Bank Group, and dis-
cusses its potential as a tool for peace-building. Finally, Part IV
offers proposals for greater IFI impact and efficiency in peace
operations, including a reinterpretation of the concept of "polit-
ical" action as employed in the IBRD, IDA, and regional bank
Articles of Agreement; a more flexible and country-specific ap-
proach to conditionality; and a greater coordination with relief
agencies, non-governmental organizations, bilateral donors, and
other U.N. organizations.
21. Linarelli, supra note 11, at 280.
22. Alvaro de Soto & Graciano del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding: United Na-
tions, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 22, 1994, at 69.
23. The World Bank Group comprises the IBRD and the International Develop-
ment Association (the "IDA"). See Orford, supra note 8, at 464-65 n.98.
24. See FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1.
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I. BACKGROUND: RELEVANT HISTORY
AND CHARTER PRO VISIONS
A proper understanding of the potential roles of the Bret-
ton Woods institutions in international peace operations re-
quires a brief analysis of their history and critical charter provi-
sions. The history of the IFIs elucidates many of the current bar-
riers facing them in the peace-building context.
The World Bank and IMF were created in the wake of
World War II at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hamp-
shire.25 Their incorporation was motivated in large part by the
pressing needs of the postwar international economy and the de-
sire to erect a lasting peace. 26 The IMF was designed to promote
relative exchange rate stability, to provide liquidity for short-
term balance-of-payments deficits, and to manage exchange rate
payments. 27 The World Bank would focus upon the reconstruc-
tion of besieged European nations and the development of less-
advanced economies. 28 Although peace operations of the variety
encountered in the post-Cold War era were not envisioned,29 the
IFIs were foreseen as important elements in the sustenance of
global peace.
A. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
In present-day terms, the World Bank was created with a
specific peace-building initiative in mind: to facilitate the recon-
struction ofnations ravaged by in World War II. Section I of Arti-
cle I of the IBRD's Articles of Agreement sets forth that role as
one of the principal enumerated functions of the Bank:
25. A third institution, the International Trade Organization, was proposed as
well, but it failed to survive a veto in the U.S. Congress. Hans W. Singer, Rethinking
Bretton Woods: From an Historical Perspective, in PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT: EFFECTIVE
GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bern-
hard G. Gunter eds., 1995).
26. The IFIs were to prevent a relapse into the type of depression that occurred in
the 1930s, deemed a causal factor for World War II. See Michael P. Malloy, Shifting
Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1911, 1912
(1994); Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1, 1, 6. For a broad discussion of the
objectives sought at the Bretton Woods Conference, see generally Gerald M. Meier, The
Bretton Woods Agreement-25 Years After, 23 STAN. L. REv. 235, 237-45 (1971).
27. See DAVID D. DRISCOLL, THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK: How Do THEY DIFFER?
2-3 (1994).
28. Id. at 5-7.
29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories
of members by facilitating the investment of capital for pro-
ductive purposes, including the restoration of economies de-
stroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive
facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the
development of productive facilities and resources in less de-
veloped countries."
Section V of Article I adds that the IBRD is "in the immediate
post-war years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition
from a wartime to a peacetime economy."31 Thus, the IBRD was
founded to address two major issues: the rebuilding of peaceful
societies in the wake of war and the sustainable development of
less economically advanced nations. A plain reading of Article I
and the historical factors that drove the Bank's creation suggest
that reconstruction was intended to be, at least initially, the pre-
dominant IBRD role. 2
Soon after its inception, the Bank was granted an early re-
prieve from one of its twin missions. By 1947, the United States
had become concerned about the slow progress of economic re-
covery in Europe." Therefore, the U.S. Congress enacted the
30. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. 1, § I (as amended effective Feb. 16, 1989), reprinted in
IBRAHim F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 345 (1992) [hereinafter
IBRD Articles of Agreement].
31. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 30, art. I, § 5. The additional enumer-
ated purposes of the IBRD include the following:
(II) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or partici-
pations in loans and other investments made by private investors; and when
private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private in-
vestment, by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive pur-
poses out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources. (III) To
promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the main-
tenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international
investment for the development of the productive resources of members,
thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions
of labor in their territories. (IV) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by
it in relation to international loans through other channels so that the more
useful and urgent projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first. (V)
To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international invest-
ment on business conditions in the territories of members ....
Id. art. I, §§ II-V.
32. Michael Malloy argues that "the priority of reconstruction over development"
is a "key, original value of the Bretton Woods System." Malloy, supra note 26, at 1929.
33. U.S. President Truman initiated the "Truman Plan" to mobilize support for
Europe, and U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall formulated the program that be-
came known as the Marshall Plan. See Caroline Doggart, From Reconstruction to Develop-
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Marshall Plan, which assumed the responsibility of rebuilding
the war-torn states of Europe and Japan,3 4 leaving the World
Bank to concentrate upon its second major purpose: develop-
ment.3 '5 Thus, in its formative years, the World Bank assumed an
emphasis on development, profoundly influencing its growth
and direction. 6 Over time, the primacy of development in the
IBRD agenda has created a conceptual and institutional barrier
against Bank action in post-conflict societies, a factor that re-
mains problematic in the post-Cold War era. 7
Although the World Bank was designed to facilitate the re-
construction of postwar Europe, it was born in a turbulent era of
geopolitical history, a fact that resulted in significant restrictions
on its permitted scope of action. Three of the paramount voices
at the Bretton Woods Conference were those of the United
States, Great Britain, and Russia. The balancing of tripolar polit-
ical ideologies-capitalist, socialist, and. communist-was an in-
dispensable consideration in the founding of international fi-
nancial organs. Consequently, Lord John Maynard Keynes, con-
cerned primarily about potential IBRD biases against socialism,
proposed that the Bank be prohibited from activities that inter-
fere with, or discriminate on the basis of, the political affairs of
member nations.38 That provision became Section 10 of Article
IV, which reads as follows:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political
affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or mem-
bers concerned. Only economic considerations shall be rele-
vant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be
weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in
Article I.
3 9
ment in Europe and Japan, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK: HELPING MEET
THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 37, 41 (K. Sarwar Lateef ed., 1995).
34. See id., at 52-53; Halim Moris, The World Bank and Human Rights: Indispensable
Partnership or Mismatched Alliance?, 4 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 173, 178 (1997).
35. Singer, supra note 25, at 4. For a more comprehensive discussion of the Bank's
historical shift from reconstruction to development in its nascent years, see generally
Doggart, supra note 33, at 37-53.
36. Doggart, supra note 33, at 52-53; Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1, 9 12.
37. See Linarelli, supra note 11, at 280-81.
38. Interview with Abram Chayes, Professor, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge,
Mass. (Apr. 10, 1998).
39. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 30, art. IV, § 10.
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The language of this provision was left intentionally broad, thus
circumscribing as narrowly as possible the IBRD's ability to move
beyond "economic considerations." The provision's lack of spec-
ificity facilitated expansive definitions of "political affairs" and
"political character," which were adopted and developed
throughout the Bank's early years.
An expansive interpretation of the "political action" provi-
sion was deemed imperative in the Cold War geopolitical frame-
work.4 ° Given the intense political tension between nations, par-
ticularly the United States and the U.S.S.R., IFI efforts to pro-
mote liberal democracy in emerging or war-stricken nations
would have generated substantial resistance within the United
Nations and the wider international community. As a result, the
broad interpretation of Article IV, Section 10 was accepted,
eclipsing many forms of action by the IBRD and its subsidiaries,
whose charters contain substantially identical provisions.41
Article IV, Section 10, as interpreted, has been a major fac-
tor in the Bank's relative lack of involvement in peace operations
throughout its history as U.N.-mediated peace processes were
considered topics of inherently political character throughout
the Cold War.4 2 Although the fall of the Communist regime in
Russia has reduced practical barriers to IFI action in arguably
"political" spheres, Article IV, Section 10 has not been signifi-
cantly reinterpreted. Consequently, even in the context of a
more unipolar geopolitical climate, the Bank has been limited
by the broad traditional reading of Article IV, Section 10.
In reconstruction projects, this charter provision has essen-
40. See Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the IMF and the World Bank?, 62 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1989, 1992 (1994). Dominique Carreau offers a second interpretation as to
why the Bank was prohibited from political activity. She contends that the World Bank
functions largely as a commercial bank and that to meddle in the affairs of clients
would subject the Bank to liability. Id. Carreau also acknowledges the importance of
the geopolitical factors in the apoliticization of the Bank. Id.
41. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DE-
VELOPMENT 2 n.2 (1990). Language similar to that of Article IV, § 10 of the IBRD Arti-
cle of Agreement appears in the charters of the International Development Association,
Charter of the International Development Association arts. V, § 6, VI, § 5c, the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, Charter of the International Finance Corporation arts. I1,
IV, § 5c, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Charter of the Multilateral In-
vestment Guarantee Agency arts. 33(c), 34, the Asian Development Bank, Charter of
the Asian Development Bank art. 36, the IDB, Charter of the IDB art. VIII, § 5d-f, and
the African Development Bank, Charter of the African Development Bank art. 38.
42. See Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1, 18.
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tially limited the Bank to involvement after a state has achieved a
reasonable measure of political stability.43 In the use of condi-
tionality, Article IV, Section 10 has confined the Bank to primar-
ily economic and social reform. Although substantial evidence
suggests that IBRD programs do have a pronounced political im-
pact," the World Bank's broadly-interpreted prohibition on
political action has clearly retarded its historical and present-day
participation in peace operations.'5
Despite historical barriers to post-war reconstruction and
"political" intervention, the World Bank has become markedly
more involved in peace operations in recent years. The most
important steps have been taken in post-conflict reconstruction,
as James D. Wolfensohn, the current IBRD President, has ac-
tively sought to bolster Bank action in nations afflicted by war.
His principal initiative, encapsulated in a 1997 IBRD publica-
tion, will be reviewed extensively in Part II of this Article.
B. The International Monetary Fund
Unlike the World Bank, the IMF was not created to address
specific tasks in post-war reconstruction or development.
Rather, the IMF was to serve as a type of international central
bank, maintaining exchange rate stability, providing short-term
liquidity to members in need of balance-of-payments support,
presiding over international exchange rate payments, and pro-
moting the Bretton Woods "code of good monetary conduct."4 6
Although international monetary policy was to be an indirect
factor in the maintenance of the peace, the IMF was not con-
ceived as an agency directed toward the needs of post-conflict or
deeply-impoverished nations.
43. Linarelli, supra note 11, at 281.
44. See generally Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World
Bank and the Democratization of Deuelopment, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159 (1993); Orford,
supra note 8.
45. Linarelli, supra note 11, at 281. Due to their political limitation, Linarelli char-
acterizes both the Bank and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") as "far from the
ideal institutions for peace-building." Id. The restriction on their political involvement
has effectively shielded them from many forms of action in early-stage peace-building or
where national politics are highly volatile. Id. "Thus, there is a void between United
Nations functions in peace-building and that of the Bretton Woods institutions." Id.
46. The "code of good monetary conduct" entailed the avoidance of "competitive
exchange depreciation" and therefore reinforced the IMF's other roles. See Carreau,
supra note 40, at 1990-91.
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Article I of the IMF Articles of Agreement sets forth its pur-
poses, two of which bear particular relevance to the peace-build-
ing process:
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of inter-
national trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion
and maintenance of high levels of employment and real in-
come and to the development of the productive resources of
all members as primary objectives of economic policy...
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general
resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under
adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity
to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments with-
out resorting to measures destructive of national or interna-
tional prosperity. 47
The "development of productive resources" and provision of
short-term liquidity were not the predominant functions of the
IMF at its outset. As decolonization progressed throughout the
world, however, the IMF began increasingly to turn to develop-
ing markets.
The most profound change in the IMF took place, however,
on August 15, 1971, when President Richard Nixon and the
United States revolutionized the international monetary system,
moving off of the gold standard.48 The IMF, an organization
created to oversee the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime, was
forced to explore and to develop other roles, many of which re-
lated to development. Since the move from the gold standard,
Fund activities have converged toward those of the IBRD, center-
47. The remaining purposes set forth in Article I of the Articles of Agreement of
the IMF are as follow: (i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution that provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration
on international monetary problems; (iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain
orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation; (iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions that hamper the growth of world trade; and (vi) In accordance
with the above, to shorten the duration and to lessen the degree of disequilibrium in
the international balances of payments of members. Articles of Agreement of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, reprinted in PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., DOCUMENTS FOR INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 1 (1993) [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement].
48. In 1971, the United States decided to devalue the dollar by allowing it to float
against other currencies. U.S. President Nixon also suspended the redemption of dol-
lars for gold. The U.S. decision revolutionized the international monetary regime and
the IMF. See Malloy, supra note 26, at 1922; Carreau, supra note 40, at 1994.
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ing more upon structural adjustment and emerging-world
macroeconomic development.
The history of the IMF has left it with profound institutional
questions in the present era. Many observers have viewed the
Fund and the World Bank as functionally difficult to distin-
guish,49 and some have suggested a merger.5 ° In the context of
peace operations, it is unclear how the role of the IMF will di-
verge from the role of the Bank. To date, the Bank has taken
the lead role in post-conflict reconstruction, and IMF participa-
tion in the peace process has been limited. Its recent programs
are discussed below.
The IMF does have an important peace-building advantage
vis-4-vis other IFIs. Because the drafters at Bretton Woods per-
ceived its functions as inherently less political than those of the
Bank, the IMF has no charter provision forbidding its involve-
ment in "political" subject matter. As an historical matter, the
IMF has followed a practice similar to that of the Bank, the IDA,
and the regional development banks. The IMF, however, lacks
the encumbrance of an explicit legal restriction in its charter.
II. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
Post-conflict reconstruction is one of the two major IFI ap-
proaches to peace-building. It is an ex post form of action, "cur-
ing" conflict by healing the deep economic and social wounds
inflicted by war. It necessarily performs an ex ante function as
well, however, by preventing relapse into conflict due to contin-
ued social and economic plight.
Legally, reconstruction is the IFIs' less controversial means
of addressing conflict. As discussed above, the World Bank was
specifically created to address the reconstruction needs of post-
conflict societies.5" The IMF, while lacking an explicit statutory
mandate to carry out reconstruction programs, has appropri-
ately encountered little legal resistance to post-conflict involve-
ment, which is easily subsumed under its authorized functions as
a provider of short-term liquidity and a developer of productive
resources.
In recent years, reconstruction programs have become a sig-
49. See Malloy, supra note 26, at 1923; Carreau, supra note 40, at 1995.
50. See generally Carreau, supra note 40, at 1995.
51. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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nificant focus of the World Bank, and the IMF has likewise
heightened its involvement. Part II of this Article begins with a
review of World Bank initiatives to date, focusing on the Bank's
primary statement of policy and recommendations in the field,
the Framework, a paper released by President James D. Wolfen-
sohn in April 1997.52 Part II then provides a brief review of re-
cent initiatives by the IMF in post-conflict reconstruction.
A. Review of World Bank Programs
When James D. Wolfensohn took office in 1995, he enumer-
ated six major goals for the World Bank during a speech at the
Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group.5" He described the
last of his six objectives was as follows: "[the IBRD] must antici-
pate and be organized for post-conflict economic development
programs, when war is replaced by peace. '5 4 It is notable that he
used the term "post-conflict development programs, ' 55 as op-
posed to "reconstruction programs." His speech broadly re-
flected a vision of the World Bank as a development agency with
certain functions in post-conflict countries, not an agency with
two similarly important mandates: development and reconstruc-
tion.56
The historical World Bank prioritization on its development
mandate is the foremost impediment to IBRD effectiveness in
post-conflict reconstruction. While there is no doubt that the
IBRD has a statutory mandate as a development agency, it like-
wise has a clearly-delineated role as a reconstruction agency.
57
52. See supra note 1.
53. James D. Wolfensohn, 1995 Annual Meetings Speech (Oct. 10, 1995) (tran-
script available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/exteme/dwamsp.htm>)
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Wolfensohn, 1995 An-
nual Meetings Speech].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Although Wolfensohn included post-conflict efforts as one of his six priorities
upon assuming the Bank's presidency, his first three annual addresses somewhat belie
that priority, focusing predominantly upon development issues and mentioning post-
conflict involvement only briefly. See id; see also James D. Wolfensohn, 1996 Annual
Meetings Speech (Oct. 1, 1996) (transcript available at <http://www.worldbank.org/
html/extdr/exteme/jdwams96.htm>) (on file with the Fardham International Law Jour-
nal); James D. Wolfensohn, 1997 Annual Meetings Address: The Challenge of Inclu-
sion (Sept. 23, 1997) (transcript available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
am97/jdw..sp/jwsp97e.htm>) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
57. See supra Part I.A.
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In the post-Cold War era, the proliferation of armed conflict de-
mands that it adapt to fill that charter-prescribed role. Thus far,
however, the World Bank has not made the far-reaching institu-
tional changes necessary to maximize its effectiveness as a recon-
struction agency.
Despite its failure to embrace its reconstruction role fully,
the World Bank has made significant and laudable progress in
post-conflict reconstruction.5" The following discussion centers
around the World Bank's 1997 Framework, which includes World
Bank policy and recommendations for post-conflict intervention.
In most aspects, the initiative is well-directed and appropriate,
and it properly identifies the major areas for IBRD action. It is
overly conservative in its general approach, however, due to the
central problem identified above: the Bank's unwillingness to
make more extensive institutional changes and embrace a dual
identity. Consequently, the Bank remains unable to address all
of the problems of reconstruction at maximal effectiveness.
1. Overview of the Framework
The World Bank's Framework was drafted "to provide a con-
ceptual and operational framework for World Bank staff working
in post-conflict situations, while encouraging ingenuity, creativ-
ity, and initiative appropriate to individual country situations."5
The Framework begins with an introduction, emphasizing the in-
ternational importance of the Bank's role in reconstruction.6 ° It
then highlights the profound social and economic costs of con-
flict and stresses the interrelated nature of war and impoverish-
ment, charging the Bank to respond to the crises of post-war na-
tions "within its development mandate."61 Finally, the Framework
introduces the crucial role of "development assistance" in
preventing relapses into conflict and asserts the importance of
integrating country sensitivity into a vision of development.62
The remainder of the Framework identifies challenges to the
Bank in post-conflict reconstruction, provides lessons and exam-
ples from past experience, and develops therefrom a new model
58. Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1, 1 49.
59. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at i.
60. See id. at 1-2. Despite the stress that the Framework paper places upon recon-
struction, the paper refers to the IBRD as a "development agency." Id.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 3-4.
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for post-conflict intervention. The issues that it raises can be
broadly divided as follows: early-phase activities, including de-
mobilization, clearance of landmines, refugee resettlement, and
vital infrastructure repair; donor coordination; operational effi-
ciency, including the preparation of "Watching Briefs," the
timely, effective implementation of strategy on the ground, in-
creased field presence, and inter-agency cooperation; increased
risk exposure; the need to work with a stable counterparty; and
the looming problem of third-world debt. Bank activities and
Framework guidelines in each of these areas are reviewed below.
As the following discussion will seek to demonstrate, many
of the Framework's recommendations should indeed be used as
models to build on in the future. In each major area of interven-
tion, however, the IBRD is unable to perform at maximal effi-
ciency, because, in various ways, it has yet to embrace its function
as a reconstruction agency sufficiently.
2. Early-Phase Reconstruction Activities
One of the most critical aspects of peace-building is the cre-
ation, via early involvement, of conditions requisite to the re-
sumption of normal economic activity and growth.63 Such re-
building is the essence of reconstruction: converting a society
ravaged by conflict into one prepared to undertake sustainable
development programs.64 The Framework refers to the process as
early-phase reconstruction and properly identifies its major com-
ponents, which may be broadly divided into four categories: the
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; the neutrali-
zation and clearance of land mines; the resettlement of refugees
and internally displaced persons ("IDPs"); and the construction
of fundamental infrastructure needs such as irrigation, roads,
and power.
Each of the four processes above represents a critical pre-
cursor to the resumption of sustainable economic growth and
social stability. Each also represents a vital safeguard against re-
sumption of conflict. Such processes are costly and challenging,
however, and their demands often exceed the capacity of both
63. Nicole Ball terms such early involvement "post-conflict transition assistance"
and deems it the key to successful peace-building operations. See BALL, supra note 15, at
49.
64. See generally id.
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post-war states and the humanitarian aid community. U.N.
peacekeeping operations are also not well-situated to accomplish
all of the necessary tasks. Consequently, the World Bank must
be a leading participant, providing both financial assistance and
technical expertise in a timely manner. The Framework does not,
however, provide detailed directives for early-phase reconstruc-
tion activities.
The following discussions will review recent World Bank
programs in each of the four critical areas-demobilization,
demining, refugee resettlement, and infrastructure-building-
and highlight the challenges that remain. In each case, funding,
sound planning and operation, and rapidity of response present
the most significant challenges to IBRD efficacy. Each of these
challenges is linked to the Bank's need. to embrace its identity as
a reconstruction agency more fully.
a. Demobilization and Reintegration Programs
Shortly after a successful cease-fire is achieved, a war-torn
country is faced with the formidable tasks of demobilizing armed
forces and reintegrating ex-combatants into the fabric of society.
Demobilization and reintegration programs ("DRPs") therefore
constitute a central element in the transition from war to peace
and are clear prerequisites to the reemergence of social and eco-
nomic, stability.65 The Framework acknowledges the World Bank's
inadequate capacity to deal with such problems, but does not
offer detailed prescriptions for improvement.66
An effective DRP confers three extremely important bene-
fits upon a society. First, it allows for a major reduction in fiscal
65. NAT J. COLETrA ET AL., THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA (1996); see also BALL, supra note 15, at 41-44 (providing brief overview of demo-
bilization and reintegration programs ("DRPs") and issues crucial to their successful
implementation); see also Hampson, supra note 12, at 706.
66. The World Bank paper entitled A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-
Conflict Reconstruction ("Framework") asserts:
The expertise on demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants devel-
oped in the Africa region and described in a best practices paper, is being
drawn upon elsewhere on an ad hoc basis, but current ability to respond is
limited. Reintegration of displaced populations is clearly a major component
of the reconstruction task, indicating a need for greater Bank expertise and
capacity, and greater collaboration with UNHCR. Sector work is needed, par-
ticularly where displacement is very high.
FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 27.
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expenditures on the military.67 In many nations emerging from
war, a large fraction of government funds are spent on the
armed forces. The redirection of those funds to pressing recon-
struction needs eases the formidable burdens of internal and ex-
ternal debt of postwar countries and allows for a more expedient
return to economic normalcy.6" The second major benefit of a
successful DRP is the reduction of security risks and social ten-
sion brought about by demilitarization.6 9 Soldiers in post-con-
flict countries often present the greatest perceived threat to
continued peace, and their reintegration eases the transition to
peace and more stable governance. A final benefit of DRPs is
the assistance that they provide ex-combatants, often a large frac-
tion of the population, in their return to civil pursuits, often fol-
lowing years of armed combat.
In recent years, the World Bank has acquired limited expe-
rience in DRPs,7 ° participating in multi-donor investments in
Uganda,71 Bosnia,72 Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Si-
erra Leone. Although case studies show that demobilization can
be effectively accomplished, program success has been highly va-
riable from country to country.73 Case studies demonstrate that
67. Following demobilization in Ethiopia, defense expenditures dropped from
46.6 percent to 16.4 percent of government outlays. Similar reductions occurred in
Namibia, where expenditures fell from 12.4 percent to 6.4 percent, and Uganda, where
expenditures fell from 34.9 percent to 25.0 percent. COLE'rIA ET AL., supra note 65, at
62.
68. Id. at 41; see MATS R. BERDAL, DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION AFTER CIVIL
WARS 5 (1996).
69. BERDAL, supra note 68, at 5.
70. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 15.
71. The Uganda Veterans Assistance Program, hailed as an IBRD success, was con-
ducted from 1992 to 1996, with the Bank serving as fund coordinator. The Bank-coor-
dinated assistance of US$20 million supported the establishment of the Uganda Veter-
ans Association Board, which facilitated the demobilization and reintegration of 36,400
soldiers. Support for the soldiers' relatives was also provided. Id. at 16. See The World
Bank Group, The World Bank: Making a Difference: Ugandan Soldiers Return to Civilian Life
(visited Apr. 9, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/
dif7.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
72. The 1996 project in Bosnia cost US$20 million dollars, US$7.5 million from an
IBRD credit, and provides support for demobilized soldiers through two Employment
and Training Foundations. The project provides employment counseling, training, and
management assistance to demobilized ex-combatants. See The World Bank Group, De-
mobilization Support and Reintegration (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/bosnia/b&h012.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
73. Some of the more successful programs to date have been those conducted in
Ethiopia and Uganda, where most program objectives were met. Less successful pro-
1998] BRETTON WOODS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
funding, timing, and ground expertise all present serious chal-
lenges to the effective implementation of a DRP.
The first critical concern in implementing an effective DRP
is funding. DRPs require significant expenditures74 and al-
though funding is by no means sufficient to ensure successful
demobilization and reintegration, it is almost always necessary
for their effective implementation. 5 Unfortunately, financial
succor from abroad has typically arrived well after the appropri-
ate time for project commencement. 7 Donors tend to be con-
servative; they are reluctant to participate absent assurances of
the political ability and volition to implement the DRP. In addi-
tion, many donors have yet to formally embrace the develop-
mental nature of DRPs, treating them instead as political and
military matters. Similar factors are responsible for the insuffi-
cient leadership of the IFIs in DRP financing.
7 7
When financing does materialize, it is frequently targeted
toward specific areas of the program. Donors' earmarking of
funds complicates coordination, often leading to disorderly ad-
ministration and thus deterring additional donor participa-
tion. 7' The earmarking of funds can also generate resentment,
as ex-combatants are funded disproportionately. 79 Finally, the
objectives sought by donors do not always correspond to the
grams were implemented in Eritrea, Namibia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.
See generally COLETrA ET AL., supra note 65, ch. 5.
74. The largest African DRP to date, which reintegrated approximately 475,000
Ethiopian ex-combatants, cost US$195 million. Id. at 29.
75. BERDAL, supra note 68, at 59.
76. El Salvador provides an apt example. Since 1995, when the U.N. mission was
formally accomplished, the peace process has been hindered by the lack of funding for
reintegration programs. Id. Similar problems were experienced in Mozambique,
where the peace process was delayed by a lack of funding for DRP programs in 1994,
and in Liberia, where the 1996 resumption of conflict was partly attributed to the lack
of resources for demobilization. Finally, a fund shortage was a major cause for the
failure of the Angolan reintegration project in 1992. Id.; see COLETTA ET AL., supra note
65, at 30.
77. Although its charter provision barring political activity was formerly inter-
preted so as to discourage such activity, the World Bank has increasingly acknowledged
the developmental import of DRPs. Nevertheless, credit risk and the traditional Bank
practice of dealing with credible governments remains formidable. BERDAL, supra note
68, at 67-69.
78. Id. at 67. An example of targeted financing in the DRP context would be a
donor's stipulation that funds be directed toward ex-soldiers suffering from a disability
incurred in war. Analogous types of earmarking occurred during the implementation
of a DRP in El Salvador. Id.
79. Id.
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needs of program coordinators on the ground, which signifi-
cantly stymies operational efficacy8 0 Thus far, though it is the
logical agency to coordinate DRP funding, the World Bank has
not provided a sufficient antidote.8 1
The second major concern in DRP implementation is tim-
ing. A successful DRP program requires substantial political will
and leadership and should be addressed at the earliest stages of
the peace process, even before a peace accord is signed.82 As
many specific provisions as possible should be accounted for in
the actual peace accord, as evidence suggests that terms left for
subsequent workout lead to damaging politicization of the im-
plementation process.8" In addition, assistance is more likely to
be timely and to fall into the temporal window necessary to es-
tablish peace, if negotiations take place early in the peace pro-
cess.8 4 Therefore, the World Bank should properly be involved,
through representation if necessary, in early-stage peace talks.
Its role as the international leader in post-conflict reconstruction
makes it an appropriate agency to suggest terms for a DRP early
in the peace process. To date, the World Bank has not taken on
such a role, motivated at least in part by the view that certain
reconstruction-related activities violate Article IV, Section 10 of
its charter.8 5
The third major challenge to implementation of an effec-
tive DRP is achieving sound management and expertise, both in
planning and on the ground. Thus far, the World Bank has con-
cededly failed to achieve sufficient expertise, a fact that must be
80. Id.
81. The IBRD has hesitated to fund certain projects due to a fear of corruption or
political instability. Its contributions since 1990, however, are a very welcome addition
to international peace operations. Id. at 68.
82. Id. at 21; see COLETrA ET AL., supra note 65, at 7.
83. BERDAL, supra note 68, at 74.
84. COLETrA ET AL., supra note 65, at 7.
85. The World Bank has not undertaken a role in the negotiation of peace ac-
cords, which it deems too highly political. The Framework includes the following as
guiding principles of IBRD involvement in post-conflict reconstruction: "[t] he Bank is
not in charge of peace-making or peace-keeping. These are functions of the U.N. and
certain regional organizations. It should be noted, however, that through its develop-
mental mandate the Bank can indirectly assist peace efforts" and "[u] nder the explicit
provisions of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank does not question the political charac-
ter of a member and should not interfere in the domestic political affairs of a member."
FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 8.
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remedied. 86 A successful DRP requires several elements: local
87 lsiiaino hand national political cooperation, a sound classification of the
characteristics and needs of ex-combatants,88 "safety-net" transi-
tional assistance for the families of demobilized soldiers, 89 coun-
seling and training services, 90 community awareness programs,9"
efficient central coordination with local representation,92 and
continual upgrade of ground operations to reflect country devel-
opments. 93 DRPs must also be conducted with a smooth and im-
mediate transition from disarmament and demobilization to re-
integration, with sufficient flexibility to respond quickly to needs
on the ground.94 Finally, greater attention must be paid to the
rapid reform of police forces, local judicial systems, and other
elements of the security sector.95
While a thorough review of individual DRP programs and
their strengths and weaknesses is beyond the scope of this essay,
the complexity and importance of DRP implementation is evi-
dent. The World Bank has properly become involved in DRP
funding in the past eight years, but its involvement must go
deeper for future DRPs to meet with more consistent success. In
order to do so, the Bank must move closer to the nexus of the
peace process, immersing itself in some of the country-specific
issues that it formerly deemed too political for its development
mandate. It must also implement staff training that will bolster
currently inadequate levels of institutional expertise.96
b. Clearance of Landmines
The clearance of landmines is a second major concern in
rebuilding war-torn societies.9 7 During conflict, landmines are
86. See supra note 66.
87. See COLETrA ET AL., supra note 65, at 6-8.
88. See id. at 8-12.
89. See id. at 15-18.
90. See id. at 19.
91. See id. at 24-25.
92. See id. at 25-26.
93. See id. at 28.
94. BERDAL, supra note 68, at 75.
95. Id.
96. See supra note 66.
97. Land mine clearance has been, and continues to be, a major concern in the
reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia. See The World Bank Group, Reconstruction of
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Clearing of Landmines (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/landm.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
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laid as a means to restrict the enemy's freedom of movement
and to deter military advance. 98 Ninety percent of the casualties
inflicted by mines, however, are civilian, and most occur after
the cessation of conflict.9' In post war societies, mine fields dis-
rupt commerce and transportation, inhibiting the restoration of
economic normalcy.1 °0 Further, landmines impose social and
economic burdens by inflicting casualties and denying effective
access to buildings, homes, and arable lands.1" 1 Therefore,
demining is often a condition precedent to resettlement and
other phases of reconstruction can effectively occur,10 2 and its
expedient completion is imperative. The financial costs of clear-
ing landmines, however, are staggering, especially for societies
whose fiscal resources are modest and thinly spread. Even with
the most efficient existing technologies, the average cost of neu-
tralizing one mine is estimated at US$1,000.10 3 Total clearance
of mines from a war-stricken region takes many years and can
entail a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.104
In 1996, the World Bank initiated a response to the prob-
lem of landmine clearance, implementing emergency programs
in the former Yugoslavia. The first such program was a US$67
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter World Bank: Clearing of Landmines]. Mines are also a
serious concern in Azerbaijan, and their neutralization is a vital prerequisite to success-
ful future development and relief efforts. See International Monetary Fund, Azerbai-
jan-Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and Extended Fund Facility Policy Framework Pa-
per, 1997-2000 (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/azerb/
azer-01.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see also Gilles Cour-
rhgelongue, Mine Problems in Peacekeeping Operations, in IMPROviNG THE PROSPECTS FOR
FUTURE INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS-WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 99, 103 (U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1995); Bowley, supra note 2.
98. See Courrhgelongue, supra note 97, at 101.
99. Landmines: The Invisible Goliath: Effects (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://li-
brary.advanced.org/ 11051 /effects.htm> (on file with the Fordham International LawJour-
nal) [hereinafter Goliath: Effects].
100. World Bank: Clearing of Landmines, supra note 97.
101. Id; see Courrhgelongue, supra note 97, at 101 (asserting that "in many coun-
tries where peacekeeping and/or mine clearing operations are underway, mines have
neither been laid according to military regulation nor to military logic," thus resulting
in the placement of mines in residential communities).
102. World Bank: Clearing of Landmines, supra note 97.
103. Courrhgelongue, supra note 97, at 103.
104. The World Bank Group, Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities for
Recovery and Growth (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
extme/bhgen.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter
World Bank Priorities for Recovery and Growth]; see World Bank: Clearing of Landmines, supra
note 97.
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million project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, eleven percent of
which was funded by the Bank. The project involved setting up a
Mine Action Center to coordinate activities, such as targeting
mine clearance for critical points of infrastructure reconstruc-
tion, holding mine awareness programs for persons in affected
areas, and providing technical assistance and training for mine
clearance. 10 A similar US$34 million project, eighty-three per-
cent of which was funded by the World. Bank, was implemented
in Croatia to clear areas of high economic priority for recon-
struction.10 6 Nevertheless, in both Croatia and in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, many areas of lesser economic priority were roped
off to be cleared in the future. 107
Though the projects in the former Yugoslavia evidenced a
Bank willingness to participate in mine-clearance, IBRD involve-
ment must be drastically increased if peace-building is to occur
at maximal efficacy.10 At present, well over 110 million active
mines are laid on the planet, killing over 800 people per month
and maiming or crippling many more. Mines are being laid at
twenty times the rate that they are being cleared, mostly in socie-
ties whose financial ability to address the problem is highly con-
strained. 0 9 In many war-torn societies, mine clearance thus be-
comes a rate limiting step to sustainable economic reconstruc-
tion.
Effective mine-clearance programs demand far more than
financial capital. The neutralization of mines is extremely dan-
gerous"' ° and requires significant inputs of ground expertise.
105. The World Bank Group, Emergency Landmine Clearing Project (visited Nov. 18,
1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/bosnia/b&hOlO.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
106. The World Bank Group, World Bank Helps Croatia Reconstruct Transportation
Routes and Clear Mines (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
extme/1 176.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
107. World Bank Priorities for Recovery and Growth, supra note 104.
108. Nicole Ball affirms the urgency of mine clearance and provides a brief discus-
sion of the issues it entails. See BALL, supra note 15, at 44-45.
109. Courrhgelongue, supra note 97, at 103. Courr~gelongue asserts that, as of
1995, two million mines were being laid per year, while the rate of demining is only
100,000 per annum. At that rate of clearance, all existing mines would not be neutral-
ized for over 1,100 years, and to clean roads, villages, and houses alone would take 300
years. Id.
110. Even using the most advanced existing technologies, demining extracts a
huge human cost. For every 1,000 mines cleared, one worker is severely injured, and
for every 5,000 mines cleared, one worker is killed. Id. at 103. Proper training pro-
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Despite efforts to develop safer and quicker methods of neutrali-
zation, manual detection remains the most effective method."'
Consequently, thorough training programs for workers are es-
sential, as are civilian awareness programs. 1 2 The World Bank
should, either in its own ranks or through stable cooperation,
develop institutional expertise in mine clearance that can be
rapidly implemented in peace operations.
Although human expertise should be developed as rapidly
as possible, the World Bank should also contribute, via a trust
fund if necessary, to research for more effective mine clearance
devices.' Current methods of manual detection are clearly inade-
quate in terms of time, expense, and safety.' Recent research
efforts have focused upon infrared technology and penetrating
radars, and studies will soon be undertaken using chemical and
nuclear detection systems." 4 Despite these efforts, no sufficient
technology has been developed. The IBRD should play a lead-
ing role in the furtherance of research. Both the economic and
social returns of an effective technology would add tremen-
dously to the capacity of the Bank to conduct effective recon-
struction.
c. Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
A third area of major concern in the reconstruction of war-
grams cannot eliminate the perils of demining, but they may be able to mitigate the
incidence of death and injury.
111. Id. at 101. There are three major methods used to detect landmines: manual
detection, pyrotechnical and mechanical demining, and detection by sniffing dogs.
Although pyrotechnical and mechanical demining are used in military emergencies,
their collateral noise and blast effects suit them poorly to use in civilian areas. Sniffing
dogs are likewise inadequate, as they tire quickly and fail to cover ground methodically.
Since mines are generally small, many the size of a palm, dogs are estimated to miss
approximately 40 percent of them in a given land area. See id. at 102.
112. Among the most tragic deaths associated with landmines occur when children
mistake them for toys. This problem has been particularly acute in Afghanistan, where
"butterfly" mines, easily mistakable for small toys, are prevalent. See Landmines: The
Invisible Goliath: What are They? (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://library.advanced.org/
11051/what.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Children and
others must be well taught to avoid the mines laid in their environs.
113. There are two major manual-detection methods. The first is to kneel and to
prod the ground with a nonmagnetic stick. This is extraordinarily time-intensive and
dangerous; deminers must be relieved every 20 minutes to avoid fatal concentration
lapses. The second method uses portable magnetometers, which can result in 1,000
false alarms for every mine cleared. Magnenometers also miss the increasing numbers
of mines made with plastic. See Courr~gelongue, supra note 97, at 101-02.
114. Id. at 104.
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torn societies is the resettlement of IDPs'115 and refugees. Tradi-
tionally, voluntary repatriation programs were viewed as the final
step in a nation's return to normalcy, occurring after peace and
a significant level of stability had been achieved." 6 The large-
scale nature of current refugee crises, 'however, has altered the
traditional paradigm and prompted the international commu-
nity to view resettlement, like demobilization and demining, as a
problem to be addressed early in the peace process. Like a DRP,
a resettlement program is complex and politically charged. It
should be contemplated during peace negotiations and under-
taken as soon as possible, as its implementation can become a
rate limiting factor to stabilization and subsequent develop-
ment.
117
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 18 ("UNHCR")
115. The global number of refugees and internally displaced persons is staggering.
In 1996, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") estimated that approx-
imately 26 million persons worldwide were displaced from their normal living environs,
including 13.2 million refugees, 4.7 million internally displaced persons, and 8.1 mil-
lion others including victims and returnees of war. The largest populations of dis-
placed persons were from Afghanistan (2.3 million), Rwanda (1.7 million), Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1.3 million), Liberia (750,000), Iraq (630,000), Somalia (446,000), Sudan
(424,000), Eritrea (362, 000), Angola (324, 000), and Sierra Leone (320,000). See U.N.
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, INFORMATION PAPER 6 (1997).
The definitions of refugees and internally displaced persons are always highly con-
troversial and are applied diversely by nations. See DANItLE JoLY, HEAVEN OR HELL?
ASYLUM POLICIES IN EUROPE 8 (1996). Although the U.N. Convention on Refugees pro-
vides a definition, it is subject to interpretation. A sound definition of internally dis-
placed persons ("IDPs") is equally difficult to achieve. That debate, however, lies be-
yond the scope of this endeavor, and in the present context, the UNHCR categoriza-
tions suffice. For the UNHCR definition of a "refugee," see DANIELE JOLY ET AL.,
REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN EUROPE? 1, 11, 19-20 (1992) [hereinafter JOLY, REFUGEES].
116. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Issues: Durable Solutions (visited
Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/issues/durable/durable.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
117. It is important to remember that, while the present discussion focuses upon
the implications of resettlement for peace, refugee crises are also a grave concern for
human rights. Often, refugees and IDPs do not possess adequate rights and living stan-
dards. See BENAIFER NOWROJEE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING THE IrTERALLY Dis-
PLACED: THE UNDP DISPLACED PERSONS PROGRAM IN KENYA 2 (1997). It is also notable
that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: "[e]veryone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care .. " U.N. Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, art. 25, § 1, cited in JoLy, REFUGEES, supra note 115, at 47.
Therefore, rapid resettlement should be sought both for its peace implications and for
other humanitarian reasons.
118. The UNHCR was established onJanuary 1, 1951 to replace the defunct Inter-
national Refugee Organization. See JoLY, REFUGEES, supra note 115, at 2-3. Since that
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and other humanitarian organizations are actively engaged in
refugee resettlement programs, and their successes have been
myriad. The UNHCR has substantial expertise and experience
in coordinating refugee and IDP resettlement programs and
should remain the primary coordinator of many tasks on the
ground. Resettlement projects are costly and difficult to
achieve, a a9 however, and neither the UNHCR nor afflicted states
have adequate human or financial resources to address refugee
crises fully and promptly.
Thus far, World Bank involvement has been limited. 120 It
has designed several operations in partnership with, and at the
request of, the UNHCR and other international organizations.
Its goal has been to develop programs that will sustainably con-
tinue projects initiated by the humanitarian aid community. A
significant increase in Bank participation, however, is needed.
Although the World Bank's Framework asserts that "[t]he high
degree of displacement, and the increasing numbers of inter-
nally displaced, in some countries makes directed resettlement
programs impracticable or accessible to only specific concen-
trated groups of displaced," 12' refugee and IDP resettlement
needs IFI financial and technical support to implement effective
programs swiftly.
As in other areas, the World Bank should develop greater
time, it has been the primary U.N. agency charged with the provision of relief and
repatriation for displaced persons. Id. at 11.
119. Refugee resettlement must take account of a variety of factors; programs must
be tailored to respond to the particular needs of refugees of varying family relation-
ships, age, gender, socio-economic background, and history of migration. See generally
JoL, REFUGEES, supra note 115, ch. 7. Resettlement entails the rapid provision of hous-
ing, employment opportunities, education and training, health services, transportation,
and basic utilities. See id. ch. 8. Finally, resettled persons must be effectively reinte-
grated into a social and political fabric from which they were excluded. This requires
sensitizing communities through a variety of awareness programs. See id. ch. 9. Conse-
quently, the expertise demanded in resettling populations is substantial.
120. Limited IBRD collaboration with the UNHCR has occurred since 1984, when
an initial program for development-oriented assistance to third-world refugees was cre-
ated. The Bank's early collaborative programs were generally confined to assisting refu-
gees in resource management and food production. SeeJames C. Hathaway, A Reconsid-
eration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 159-60 (1990).
Over the past six years, World Bank participation in repatriation programs has been
growing, as the Bank has played a role in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Azerbaijan, Eri-
trea, and elsewhere. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at
15.
121. Id.
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institutional expertise in refugee and IDP resettlement. It is ac-
ceptable for the UNHCR and others to remain the primary coor-
dinators of ground operations, but World Bank staff should be
prepared to deal with operational problems as well. In this re-
gard, the World Bank and UNHCR would profit from thorough
training seminars, administered by the UNHCR, to edify World
Bank staff working in the field. Resettlement combines complex
economic, social, and political issues, and well-directed World
Bank participation requires a sound base in knowledge and ex-
perience.
Not surprisingly, funding is the aspect in which the IBRD
could play the greatest role. To be effective, resettlement pro-
grams entail moving large numbers of people, setting up institu-
tions for education and employment, monitoring human rights
practices, and other tasks. The high number of displaced per-
sons makes all of those endeavors more costly to implement and
to administer, and host countries rarely have the financial capac-
ity or political will to carry out programs themselves. As a result,
the World Bank must assume leadership in financing such pro-
grams. When a credible government counterparty is not avail-
able, the World Bank may rely on a trust fund or similar arrange-
ment to administer funds. 122
As discussed above, resettlement should be initiated as soon
as conditions permit. In some cases, resettlement programs may
begin before an ultimate cease-fire occurs, as liberated or evacu-
ated areas may permit rehabitation or reintegration of displaced
persons. The World Bank's program for Afghan Refugees in
Pakistan, under which a trust fund allowed for funds to flow to
refugees during continued conflict, is an excellent example of a
successful wartime resettlement program,123 as is its repatriation
project in Azerbaijan. 124 In other societies, resettlement may
best occur at a later point when social conditions allow it to pro-
ceed with lower risk and more cost efficiency. Those decisions
should be made during peace negotiations with World Bank and
UNHCR expertise exerting due influence.
122. Trust funds and other forms of financing are useful devices when the Bank
does not have a suitable government counterparty with whom to deal. See infra Part
II.A.5-6.
123. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 17.
124. In Azerbaijan, a resettlement program was effectively initiated before the oc-
currence of an ultimate cease-fire.
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d. Building and Repair of Vital Infrastructure
A final precursor to a war-torn society's return to social and
economic stability is the provision of basic infrastructure needs.
The Framework appropriately asserts that infrastructure repair
and building has been a "traditional area of strength' 1 25 for the
IBRD. In fact, the bulk of the IBRD's post-conflict reconstruc-
tion efforts have come in the context of infrastructure sup-
port.126 World Bank post-conflict infrastructure projects were
developed by analogy to preexisting IBRD functions in the con-
text of natural disasters. 127 Experience was also drawn from
traditional infrastructure projects, conducted under normal de-
velopment programs. Thus, the IBRD did not enter the sphere
of infrastructure reconstruction via a sudden and profound insti-
tutional change; rather, its involvement grew gradually out of
preexisting functions. Because the IBRD entered the field with
transferable experience and expertise, emergency infrastructure
repair and provision have been the World Bank's most successful
post-conflict role.
Nevertheless, the Framework acknowledges that the World
Bank's move into post-conflict infrastructure repair has not been
without difficulty. It asserts that "the Bank's emergency guide-
lines were developed for a project-based response to natural di-
sasters, not to the aftermath of intra-state conflicts[,] and thus
represent an imperfect framework for response to post-conflict
situations." '128 Post-conflict reconstruction is much more com-
plex than that required in the aftermath of natural disasters be-
cause it must address a much wider scope of social and eco-
nomic concerns.'29 While natural disasters tend to occur quickly
and to harm physical infrastructure primarily, wars are pro-
longed, ravaging systems that may fairly be described as "social
infrastructure," equally important to the restoration of normal,
productive economic activity.130
125. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCrrION, supra note 1, at 14.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Framework acknowledges the inadequacy of the Bank's traditional emer-
gency project procedures. In 1997, the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department un-
dertook a study to determine how the emergency procedure could be more effectively
tailored to meet post-conflict needs. Id. at 26.
130. Id. at 14.
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The World Bank has responded actively to both the physical
and social aspects of infrastructure reconstruction. The most sa-
lient example has been the IBRD participation in the former Yu-
goslavia, where, for the first time in the Bank's history, its entire
country portfolio has been administered under emergency pro-
cedures.13 1 When peace was established in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, the World Bank set out numerous infrastructure-related
objectives, among which were to restore energy service to local
communities, to build and repair roads and bridges, to restore
water and sewage services, and to construct health and educa-
tional facilities where needed.1 2 Since early 1996, the Bank has
undertaken or completed many of those projects, 3 1 investing
approximately US$400 million in the region.' 3 4 Similar rebuild-
ing of infrastructure has occurred in Croatia since the establish-
ment of peace.13 5
The greater World Bank involvement in infrastructure re-
pair has not been limited to the former Yugoslavia. Almost every
World Bank reconstruction scheme has focused largely on the
needs of vital infrastructure repair, particularly the provision of
transportation, energy, and adequate water supply.'3 6 Such
131. Id.
132. See The World Bank Group, Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities
for Recovery and Growth (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
extdr/extme/bhgen.htm> (on file with the Fordhami International Law Journal).
133. Examples of IBRD activity in infrastructure repair include rebuilding roads,
railways, schools, hospitals, and bridges and restoring energy and water supplies. See
The World Bank Group, Rebuilding Bosnia to Hit Stride in 1997 (visited Nov. 18, 1998)
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/1229.htm> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal); The World Bank Group, World Bank Approves Three Reconstruc-
tion Projects for Bosnia (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
extme/1206.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); The World Bank
Group, World Bank Approves US$50 Million to Repair More Schools and Highways in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
extme/1460.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter IBRD
Repair of Bosnian Schools].
134. See IBRD Repair of Bosnian Schools, supra note 133.
135. See The World Bank Group, World Bank Helps Croatia Reconstruct Transportation
Routes and Clear Mines (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
extme/1176.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
136. An extended report of IBRD operations is beyond the scope of this Article.
For examples of Bank programs in individual countries, however, the IBRD internet site
provides country profiles on-line. See, e.g., The World Bank Group, Georgia (visited Apr.
4, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eca/geocb.htm> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal); The World Bank Group, Cambodia (visited
Apr. 4, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eap/cmbcb.htm> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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needs are obvious precursors to social stability and economic
growth, and the World Bank has aptly focused substantial atten-
tion upon them. The Bank has also extended its programs to
address many of the social needs that follow closely upon the
building of infrastructure, providing technical and administra-
tive counseling essential to the proper operation of public works.
Although the Bank has performed relatively well in the in-
frastructure context, there remains potential for improvement.
The problems of donor support and coordination, response
time, ground expertise, and interagency cooperation have inhib-
ited the IBRD less in the context of infrastructure repair than in
other contexts, but these problems have not been eliminated.
Financing is still limited and imperfectly coordinated, succor is
still delayed by procedural inefficiencies, World Bank personnel
are still not prepared enough to achieve optimal efficacy in the
field, and the Bank still faces inefficiencies and conflicts with
other engaged agencies. These obstacles and the solutions pre-
scribed by the Framework are reviewed in the ensuing sections.
3. Donor Support and Coordination
Some of the first major reconstruction hurdles addressed in
the Framework relate to problems of donor support and coordi-
nation. 137 The Framework cites several major problems: first, do-
nors typically prefer bilateral contributions, which fragments
assistance and leads to problems with coordination."3 ' Second,
the earmarking of aid leads to disproportionate funds being
channeled toward a narrow range of some activities and an un-
derfunding of others.13 9 Third, bureaucratic approval and pro-
curement procedures often create substantial time delays be-
tween pledges and receipts of funds.1 4 ° Finally, donor support is
often less forthcoming once a conflict has receded from the pop-
ular media, creating problems with later-phase reconstruction
activities.1 4 ' The Framework notes that a number of efforts have
137. Hampson, supra note 12, at 714; FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUC-
TION, supra note 1, at 7.
138. Rwanda, for example, attracted seven U.N. agencies, myriad bilateral donors,
and over 200 NGOs, resulting in extreme confusion and significant delay. Insufficient
coordination on the ground, and low participation of home-country donors, are related
problems. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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been made internationally to increase aid coordination.
1 4 2
None of these initiatives, however, has provided a sound re-
sponse to the specific problems encountered in funding.
The Framework suggests means by which greater donor coor-
dination could be achieved. First, it properly asserts the need
for increased Bank leadership in inter-agency cooperation. It
also appropriately recommends that "[c]oordination should not
wait until program implementation, but should begin from the
earliest efforts at needs assessment and planning." '143 Finally, it
proposes a "blueprint for reconstruction" to be used in each
post-conflict setting.144 A blueprint would delineate the roles of
various participants and arrive at a pooling agreement for solic-
ited funds. 14 5 The Framework's recommendations are strong and
should be duly considered. Even if reduced to practice, how-
ever, they would not solve all of the problems of donor coordina-
tion. The following section discusses those problems in turn.
The first difficult problem for the Bank to address will be
nations' preference for bilateral aid, which results in a high level
of fragmentation and difficulty in coordination. The optimal in-
ternational solution may be to create a new division within the
World Bank to act as a central global "depository"1 4 6 for bilateral
reconstruction aid. The assistance of the United Nations, non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"), and recipient nations is
critical in this respect, as each must accept and promote such an
arrangement. Under the proposed system, "deposits" made with
the World Bank would not be denominated as Bank funds; na-
tions would not, by "depositing" with the World Bank, be sup-
porting its programs.1 47 Rather, the Bank would simply be the
coordinating agency through which disbursements take place.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 26.
144. Id. The "blueprint for reconstruction" could include a rapidly-disbursed trust
fund, administered by the Bank with unified authorization and payment policies. The
Framework cites the examples of the Bosnia and West Bank/Gaza trust funds as exam-
ples. Id.
145. Id. A recent example was the interagency task force in Angola, whose heads
were jointly appointed by the United Nations, the IBRD, and the IMF and charged with
donor and agency coordination. Id.
146. Although the terms "deposit" and "depository" are used, they are not meant
to connote the legal relationship that typically exists between a bank and its clients.
147. Thus, a country that wished to support a World Bank initiative, but also to
grant direct foreign aid, could do so through separate departments in the Bank.
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The use of the World Bank as an "aid depository" would
create substantial additional work within the IBRD, as an entire
new department would be required to administer the flow of
funds. The returns in economic efficiency enjoyed by the inter-
national aid community, however, would almost certainly be sub-
stantial. Agencies would be able to establish "accounts" into
which bilateral funds were "deposited," thus avoiding administra-
tive confusion and allowing the World Bank, a body with para-
mount financial expertise, to monitor funds. The coordination
of aid financing by the World Bank would thus create economies
of scale, as fund coordination for post-conflict operations could
be centrally administered. 4 8
Although the foregoing proposal would mark new territory
for the IBRD, its experience managing trust funds and similar
instruments should be largely transferable. The new World
Bank department would be a much-needed financial analog to
the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs (the "UNDHA"),
set up by the United Nations in 1992 to coordinate U.N.-medi-
ated relief efforts.'
49
In the likely event that the World Bank elects not to add the
proposed division, it can address the problem of bilateral aid co-
ordination by providing administrative advice to recipient na-
tions. The World Bank could also encourage recipient nations
to create temporary organizations similar to the one proposed
above and provide technical assistance in its implementation. Fi-
nally, the World Bank should use influences available to it
through the media and negotiating instruments, encouraging bi-
lateral donors to consider multilateral fund coordination and
consolidation.
The second problem encountered in fund coordination is
the problem of earmarking by which donors specify the activities
to which their contributions are directed. Earmarking creates
numerous administrative and operational problems. It compli-
cates the accounting and management of funds, and it results in
the overallocation of funds to some projects and underallocation
to others. 150 In addition, it restricts the discretion of World
148. Stremlau and Sagasti note that one of the principal challenges to contempo-
rary reconstruction efforts is the absence of a lead coordinator analogous to the U.S.
government under the Marshall Plan. Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 2, 14.
149. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 7.
150. Donor support is inextricably linked to domestic political forces, which results
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Bank staff in project implementation, as funds are only available
in certain amounts for certain endeavors. Crises generating
high coverage in the international media, such as those in the
former Yugoslavia, the West Bank, and Gaza, inevitably receive
much higher levels of donor support.15
Thus far, the World Bank and other international organiza-
tions have been unable to avoid earmarked funds, as donors fre-
quently wish to-assert some control over projects that they fund,
and those funds are necessary to sustain reconstruction activities.
There is no clear way for the World Bank to eschew earmarking
without reducing its number of donors. The World Bank can
continue to discourage "tied aid," but it is unlikely to be very
successful in the short term. The best results will emerge from
cooperation among international actors--it is incumbent on the
entire peace-building community to demonstrate to donors the
pitfalls of "tied aid." To that end, the World Bank should pre-
pare and circulate a report detailing the estimated financial
costs and project inefficiencies caused by earmarking. Donors
must be made aware of the greater "returns" that they would
realize without earmarking.
A third problem with donor support is linked to the World
Bank's timing concerns. Bureaucratic approval processes and
transaction procedures often delay funds for significant periods
of time, when early-phase reconstruction is critical. The time
frame in which sustainable peace-building can occur is some-
times brief, and money must be made available during or imme-
diately after armed conflict.
The World Bank should address the problem of funding de-
lays by formulating reconstruction projects during the initial
stages of the peace process, when fighting is still occurring.152
Many of the World Bank's initial reconstruction activities, such
as demining, resettlement, DRPs, and rebuilding of infrastruc-
in high funding for popular, politically supported projects. Reconstruction programs
involving children's education may be more easily funded than those reintegrating ex-
combatants, for example.
151. The Bank's major shareholders have provided much more financial support
for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the West Bank and Gaza than they have for other
conflicts. Therefore, the Bank has been encouraged to devote disproportionate levels
of human and financial resources to those conflicts than others. Stremlau & Sagasti,
supra note 3, ch. 2, 18.
152. See generally Nicole Ball, The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies, in MAN.
AGING GLOBAL CHAos 607-22 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1996).
19981
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ture, can be largely foreseen during conflict. To the extent that
conditions change, and as peace negotiations proceed, the IBRD
plan can be updated. During that stage, the World Bank should
solicit the necessary funds, allowing ample time before cease-fire
for donors' bureaucratic processes to take place. Although as a
practical matter some donors may not come forth with funds un-
til later in the peace process, finances acquired in a timely man-
ner can be applied to the Bank's initial programs.
Although the Framework does not specifically address the
problem of early fund solicitation, its "new reconstruction frame-
work" does include sound strategies to address the issue of tim-
ing. Those strategies, along with the Framework's ground opera-
tional recommendations, are the subject of the following discus-
sion.
4. Timing, Preparation, and Operational Considerations
After highlighting problems with donor coordination, the
Framework turns to additional key issues in reconstruction-tim-
ing, preparation, and field operations-and introduces its "new
reconstruction framework," the most important contribution of
the paper. The guidelines advanced in the new framework com-
prise the following: "(i) a framework for the timing and scale of
Bank involvement in post-conflict countries, and (ii) a set of op-
erational recommendations, which include new procedural
guidelines from post conflict reconstruction activities. '
Although the Framework asserts that the paper "largely consoli-
dates recent Bank practice rather than breaking into new terri-
tory," '154 that consolidation will prove invaluable in improving fu-
ture Bank peace-building initiatives.
a. Timing and Preparation
Timing and preparation are the first subjects addressed in
the "new framework," which details a multi-phase process. As
discussed above, timing delays and lack of adequate preparation
are obstacles to IBRD effectiveness in all of the major aspects of
early-phase reconstruction. 155 The "new framework" addresses
those obstacles by implementing two pre-involvement stages.
153. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 19.
154. Id.
155. See Ball, supra note 152.
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The first pre-involvement stage entails the production of a
"Watching Brief," a document designed to develop country un-
derstanding so that the Bank is prepared to act appropriately
when feasible. 156 The IBRD will allocate modest financial re-
sources to the maintenance of a Watching Brief in countries em-
broiled in conflict.1 57 Coordination and consultation with the
United Nations and NGOs will be an important tool in informa-
tion gathering and cost reduction. 51 Watching Briefs will be up-
dated continually to reflect country changes, and annual reports
will be printed by the newly-established IBRD Post-Conflict Unit
and circulated to relevant Bank personnel. 59
The "watching-brief stage" continues until "it becomes clear
that there are opportunities for useful intervention."' 60
Although the World Bank's language could be interpreted in
more than one manner, a plain reading conveys the notion that
the Bank should not move beyond the watching-brief stage until
"useful intervention" is possible.' 6 ' This guideline undermines
much of the usefulness of watching briefs because World Bank
personnel are instructed not to create a plan of action until it
can be implemented. As discussed above, preparing a plan and
targeting funding before implementation is possible is the most
certain means of reducing timing delays. Therefore, while
Watching Briefs are an excellent means to prepare staff and to
facilitate plan preparation, they should be replaced by fuller
strategies early in the peace process.
The second phase of pre-involvement Bank procedure is to
create a Transitional Support Strategy162 ("TSS"), which repre-
sents a fuller plan of action. When a clear possibility for useful
intervention arises, World Bank regional staff will propose to the
World Bank's Operating Committee ("OC") that a TSS be pre-
156. The explicit purposes of the watching brief are enumerated in the Framework.
See FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCrION, supra note 1, at 20.
157. Id. at 21. Funding for the watching-brief stage will only be necessary in those
countries in which no Bank portfolio is active. Id. at 22.
158. Where possible, Bank personnel preparing Watching Briefs will work through
agencies with local missions or representations. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. "During the watching brief period, judgments about the opportunities and
risks associated with a higher level of activity would be updated continuously." Id. The
Framework does not, however, suggest formulation of a comprehensive plan at the
watching-brief stage.
162. Id.
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pared. 63 Upon approval by the OC, with consultation of the
Executive Directors, the TSS would commence, entailing a de-
tailed assessment of country conditions and the formulation of a
national recovery plan.'64 Once the World Bank regional staff
prepare a full strategy for intervention, detailing risk analyses,
plans for entry and exit, and prospective sources of finance,' 65
the TCC will be presented to the OC 166 whose approval will de-
pend upon three preconditions: "(i) there is sufficient indica-
tion that a sustainable cease-fire has been or will shortly be
achieved, (ii) there is an effective counterpart for the Bank;
[and] (iii) there is strong international cooperation with a well-
defined role for the Bank.' 1 67 Finally, the TSS will be forwarded
to the executive directors for endorsement. 68
Like the concept of Watching Briefs, the TSS is a very well-
conceived step in the Bank's pre-reconstruction process. The
Framework takes an important step in allowing the TSS to be ap-
proved by the OC before a sustainable cease-fire occurs. As ar-
gued above, however, the TSS should be designed before coun-
try conditions are ripe for intervention.'69
Part of the World Bank's difficulty in the timing of post-con-
flict reconstruction programs relates to the complex nature of
post-Cold War conflict and thus lies somewhat beyond its con-
trol. Early-phase activities theoretically can take place at any
time between the initiation of armed conflict and the restoration
of basic levels of political and social stability required for sound
development. Within that time frame, a war is waged, an ulti-
mate cease-fire occurs, and myriad preliminary rebuilding steps
are taken. The prolonged ebb and flow of emerging-world con-
163. Funding for this part of the Bank's work in post conflict countries will be
"explicit in the administrative budget." Id.
164. The formulation of a national recovery plan will not lock the IBRD into ac-
tion. Each plan will include "contingency plans for exit or down-scaling of initiatives,"
which will consider factors such as the likelihood of resumed conflict, financial risks,
and loss of international support for the program. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis in original).
165. The Framework asserts that, where possible, funding for Transitional Support
Strategies should arise from Bank instruments. Institutional Development Fund grants,
IBRD loans and credits, and Social Funds are all possible avenues of finance. When no
stable government counterparty exists, trust funds or similar instruments may be cho-
sen. Id.
166. Id. at 21.
167. Id. at 22.
168. Id.
169. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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flicts, however, makes it difficult for the Bank and others to relia-
bly predict when a sustainable peace accord will be signed.
World Bank involvement should sometimes occur during con-
flict, as areas are liberated. 171 In other surroundings, involve-
ment is not feasible until after a cease-fire is successfully held.
The Framework instructs World Bank personnel to com-
mence "early reconstruction activities" once the TSS is approved
by the OC and endorsed by the Executive Directors of the World
Bank. Such activities include the four major tasks identified
above: demobilization, demining, resettlement of displaced per-
sons, and repair of vital infrastructure. Those activities are fol-
lowed by "larger-scale operations," including "physical recon-
struction, economic recovery, institution building, and social re-
integration." 171 The Framework appropriately does not attempt
to create a bright line between early and later-phase reconstruc-
tion activities. In each country, the process of reconstruction
must evolve in response to specific needs.172 The Framework of-
fers little guidance as to how such affairs should be conducted,
except to emphasize the need to be "flexible and modular,"
amending programs as country conditions change.
173
As the reconstruction process continues, the IBRD can grad-
ually resume "normal operations, ' which constitute the Bank's
traditional development projects.'7 5 Again, the Framework pro-
vides little specific guidance, asserting the importance of tailor-
ing Country Assistance Strategies ("(AS") to the particular
170. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 22.
171. Id. at 24.
172. The specific needs that arise will clearly differ among post-conflict nations.
Carbonnier asserts: "from existing country case studies, it is obvious that the key issues
facing war-torn societies as they start rebuilding their economies vary greatly from case
to case." Gilles Carbonnier, Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review
of the Literature, WSP Occasional Paper No.2 (1998), ch. 3, § 1 (visited Nov. 18) <http://
www.unrisd.org/wsp/pop2/pop2-05.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
173. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 25.
174. Id.
175. Late-stage IBRD reconstruction activities are presently underway in many
countries, and the World Bank has acquired substantial experience in their implemen-
tation. To a large extent, such programs are analogous to the World Bank's traditional
development functions, and World Bank expertise is often transferable. Although late-
stage activities are important aspects of peace-building, they occur at a stage of stability
in which the Bank already functions well. Therefore, a prolonged discussion of such
activities is beyond the scope of both the Framework and this Article.
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needs of post-conflict societies.' 76
b. Operational Considerations
After providing a time-line for reconstruction activity, the
Framework turns to operational recommendations. The recom-
mendations are uniformly well-directed and should contribute
to enhanced efficiency if implemented. They are conservative,
however, and the World Bank should consider more aggressive
operational changes and additions if its impact is to be maxi-
mally effective.
The Framework's first recommendation is to increase IBRD
field presence, which is essential to effective coordination with
host countries and other organizations. Field presence is also
necessary if the World Bank is to respond flexibly to country
changes. The Framework suggests strengthening resident mis-
sions, setting up field offices, and delegating authority to field
managers in post-conflict situations.177 The costs and security
concerns of setting up offices may be substantial, and the IBRD
should consider moving into post-conflict settings with other
agencies. Occupying adjacent space may facilitate interagency
coordination, promote information transfer, and reduce some
fixed costs, especially those related to security.
Linked to the need for field presence is the need for field
expertise.' 78 The Bank established a Post-Conflict Unit'79 in July
1997, which should function to consolidate learning about post-
conflict intervention. Expertise clearly needs to be improved
both in central Bank management and among field staff.18 ° The
Framework concedes that "[t] he [former] ad hoc arrangement of
pulling in the available expertise to respond to each individual
situation [was] not working satisfactorily.., the Bank has not yet
176. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 25. Sustaina-
ble development, like late-stage reconstruction, is indisputably important to the overall
maintenance of the peace, but its discussion exceeds the bounds of this Article.
177. The Framework recommends setting up offices within the post-conflict when
possible. If security concerns are too great, an office in the nearest safe location is
acceptable. Id.
178. Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1, 44.
179. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 28. The
Post-Conflict Unit is currently in a trial period of three years.
180. "A broad consensus prevails among scholars that postconflict reconstruction
cannot succeed unless the root causes of war are correctly understood and addressed."
Carbonnier, supra note 172, ch. 3, § 2.
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fully understood the range of problems involved in rehabilitat-
ing societies which have so totally collapsed."1 "
The Post-Conflict Unit is charged with a large range of re-
sponsibilities: to provide a focal point for coordination with
other agencies involved in reconstruction; to help Bank staff
benefit from internal and external research on reconstruction;
to provide Bank staff with expertise regarding demining, DRPs,
and resettlement; to maintain multi-sectoral expertise to back up
country teams; to organize missions to countries emerging from
conflict; to participate in the design of reconstruction programs;
to oversee the preparation of Watching Briefs; to disseminate
analyses and information on reconstruction issues and practice
via a database, internet site, and other means; to coordinate
studies and hold seminars for World Bank staff; to serve as the
Secretariat for World Bank-wide issues of reconstruction; to
monitor implementation of policies and procedures, reporting
to IBRD senior management; and, among still further tasks, to
prepare an annual report.182 Although the creation of the Post-
Conflict Unit may improve World Bank understanding of post-
war issues, it is staffed by only three World Bank employees and
"a couple of consultants."'83 Given the complexity of issues in-
volved in reconstruction, the number of countries emerging
from conflict, and the need for rapid improvement of an inade-
quate institutional knowledge base, the IBRD Post-Conflict Unit
cannot be expected to perform all of its specified functions effi-
caciously-three staff members cannot respond to the demands
of dozens of nations emerging from complex social, political,
and military conflict. Ironically, the Framework advances the pre-
ceding list of functions as designed to ensure that the Post-Con-
flict Unit's work would not expand beyond its capacity.' 84 If the
World Bank is to be effective in reconstruction, meeting both
the terms of its charter and the needs of post-Cold War recon-
struction, it must dedicate significantly expanded resources,
human and financial, to the unit.' 85
The Framework also recommends an increase in expertise at
181. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 28.
182. Id. at 29.
183. Id. at 28.
184. Id.
185. The funds devoted to the Post-Conflict Unit are "modest" at present. For
example, Watching Briefs are projected to consume only 0.5 to 1.0 staff person-year,
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the levels of regional and country teams.1 86 It recommends us-
ing World Bank resources to increase the size of country teams
and recommends the cooperation between country teams to
achieve regional expertise.187 While both of these prescriptions
are sound, the World Bank has yet to take substantial steps to-
ward their achievement. In addition, the Framework says little
about the use of local resources, NGOs, and relief organizations
to assist field staff in gaining expertise. Undoubtedly, inter-
agency seminars and discussions in the field will prove mutually
beneficial if implemented.
The Framework's second major operational recommendation
is to forge strong partnerships with U.N. departments, NGOs,
and relief agencies. 188 In the past, the problems of conflicting
and overlapping mandates have plagued reconstruction ef-
forts.1 89 The World Bank should assist NGOs and local organiza-
tions in coordinating their programs, and such organizations
should help the Bank by providing a nexus between the IBRD
and specific local communities.
With regard to relief agencies, the Framework makes a
slightly misguided recommendation that "[a]s a development
agency, the Bank's main contribution in this area is likely to be
in helping to close the 'gap' between relief and development. "190
Thus, the Framework again asserts the primacy of the World
Bank's development mandate. In so doing, it creates a concept
by which the World Bank is on one side of the "gap," and the
relief agencies are on the other. In fact, as a reconstruction
agency, the World Bank should fully span that gap, not simply
minimize it. The Framework proceeds to describe a vision
whereby relief agency programs are gradually supplanted by
those of the World Bank," 1 another indication that the IBRD
perceives a discrete step between relief and reconstruction.192
and the cost of planning and assemssment of a reconstruction program is estimated at
only US$750,000. Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 2, 3.
186. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 27-28.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 25.
189. For a discussion of the problems of inter-agency rdination, see infra Part
IV.D.
190. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 25.
191. Id. at 26.
192. The Framework asserts that "it is likely that relief will continue to be needed
during at least part of the reconstruction period." Id. at 26-27.
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Such a vision undermines effective cooperation and places an
artificial barrier between activities that are inextricably tied.193
The Framework does not provide substantial guidance as to
how inter-agency cooperation could be rendered more effective.
Several proposals above, such as field operation in adjacent
space, inter-agency training seminars, and greater central fund-
ing and operational coordination, would have the effect of in-
creasing collaboration. A more detailed discussion of the prob-
lem of inter-agency collaboration can be found in Part IV of this
Article.
5. Risks to the Bank
Another consideration for the World Bank discussed in the
Framework is the increased risk associated with post-conflict in-
volvement.' 94 In a post-conflict setting, the probability of opera-
tional setbacks is greatly magnified and the resulting risks pres-
ent deterrents to IBRD intervention. The Framework divides the
risks incurred by the Bank into three categories: security risks,
financial risks, and reputational risks.'95
Security risks arise when World Bank personnel are sta-
tioned in a hostile local environment. 1" 6 The Framework recom-
mends a greater nexus between the IBRD and U.N. peacekeep-
ing forces,19 7 which is the most secure way to ensure additional
protection for Bank personnel. Physical consolidation of agency
reconstruction offices, suggested above, may also facilitate secur-
ity for staff of the World Bank and other organizations.
Financial risks are posed by the possibility of renewed hostil-
ities, high political and economic instability, donor financing
shortfalls, and impediments to coordination on the ground due
193. The process of refugee resettlement is one example of a step that cannot be
bifurcated along lines of relief aid and developmental reconstruction. An effective re-
settlement program requires the Bank to assume an intermediate role, providing quasi-
relief and quasi-developmental functions, while working with the UNHCR and others.
See supra Part II.A.2(c).
194. Nicole Ball provides a discussion of the types of increased risks faced by IFIs
in post-conflict settings: "the risks of doing business [in postconflict countries] are
much higher than in 'normal' developing countries." See Ball, supra note 152. They
include the risks of renewed hostilities, shortfalls in donor financing based on repay-
ment concerns, and physical dangers to IFI staff. Id.
195. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 30.
196. See Ball, supra note 152.
197. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 30.
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to a weak host-country institutional framework.' 98 Financial re-
turn to World Bank projects may suffer, and the World Bank
may be forced to withdraw in certain cases. Although donor co-
ordination and diversification of the World Bank's investment
portfolio can avert some of this added risk, there is no way to
eliminate risk entirely. Therefore, if the World Bank is to be a
leading agency in reconstruction, it must incur financial risks
that it has thus far been loath to assume. 199
Financial risks are linked to the World Bank's reputation,
which has long relied on its stable rating as a AAA borrower.
The IBRD understandably seeks to maintain the most credible
international reputation possible. If the World Bank does not
assist nations in reconstruction, however, it is nearly certain that
other financial organizations will not effectively fill the void.
The IBRD must therefore accept some level of "reputational"
risk along with the financial risk incurred in peace-building.
The discussion of reputational risk in the Framework assumes
a certain connotation of "reputation," one aligned with the
World Bank's traditional development function. The World
Bank has long placed great priority on its perceived financial sta-
bility, a feature that may be desirable in a development bank but
can hinder the effectiveness and involvement of a reconstruction
agency. The IBRD, as an organization with dual missions, must
find an appropriate balance between its "reputational" goals in
development and reconstruction, cognizant of its status as the
most appropriate international reconstruction agency.
Ultimately, the World Bank's steadfast self-perception as a
development agency may worsen its exposure to reputational
risk. An open institutional admission of the World Bank's dual
functions and account of the relative risks of development and
reconstruction would enable donor countries to assess the World
Bank's credibility fairly."'° Under the present scheme, the
198. Id.; see Ball, supra note 152.
199. Linarelli argues that the Bank and the IMF, as lenders, have a duty as normal
banks would, to protect their lenders by avoiding certain high-risk projects. Linarelli,
supra note 11, at 280-81. His argument, however, is incomplete; the IFIs can operate at
any level of risk, provided that they properly disclose risk and that lenders accept those
terms as inherent in reconstruction projects.
200. Stremlau and Sagasti note one problem that arises from the current fund-
pooling system. When the Bank has difficulty raising donor support for high-risk post-
conflict countries, IDA grants may be the only financing option. If grants are given
preferentially to post-conflict countries, the Bank will find itself in the awkward position
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World Bank essentially combines those risk pools but retains its
label as a "development agency." Thus, it may suffer a reputa-
tional loss in the development field. The World Bank should
reconsider its financial priorities, disaggregating its financial ac-
counting when possible and more openly dealing, with the risks
imposed by heightened post-conflict involvement.20 1
6. Dealing with a Reliable Counterparty
A penultimate concern in post-conflict reconstruction, and
one discussed in the Framework,2 °2 is finding a reliable
counterparty with whom to deal. In many cases, especially those
involving civil conflict, a stable and functioning government
does not exist during or immediately after war. Peace accords
often include an agreed procedure for elections, but there is
often a significant time lapse between a cease-fire and the point
at which election winners have reliably settled into office. Dur-
ing that time, it is essential for the World Bank to begin recon-
struction processes, so that when elections conclude the victors
have a reasonable opportunity to build peace and confidence
among the people.
The World Bank traditionally dealt only with member gov-
ernments in power, using a defacto definition of governance.20 3
That practice grew out of an interpretation of Article III, § 2 of
the IBRD Articles of Agreement, which reads: "Each member
shall deal with the Bank only through its Treasury, central bank,
stabilization fund or other similar fiscal agency, and the Bank
shall deal with members only by or through the same agen-
cies. ' 204 Membership to the World Bank is limited to members
of the IMF,205 and the Fund limits its membership to coun-
of effectively rewarding conflict. Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 2, 17. Such
competition for funds is another reason why the Bank should more explicitly separate
its functions.
201. Ball argues that "standard economic benchmarks ... will have to be funda-
mentally altered, if the immediate objective is reconstruction rather than develop-
ment." Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 2, 5 (citing Ball, supra note 152).
202. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUIrION, supra note 1, at 12-13.
203. "The crux of this policy is that the Bank does not make political choices but is
guided by the actual situation (who is in effective control) and the general recognition
of the international community." Id. at 13.
204. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 30, art. III, § 2.
205. Id. art. II, § 1.
19981
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tries.2°' Therefore, Article III, § 2 of the IBRD Articles of Agree-
ment was interpreted as limiting the Bank to dealing with agents
of empowered national governments.
The language of the provision, however, does not specifi-
cally limit the World Bank to formal organs of government be-
cause a "similar fiscal agency" need not be interpreted as an
agency of a functioning central government. The Framework pre-
sumably adopts that interpretation, as it suggests that "there may
be opportunities to work with sub-national units, NGOs or re-
gional organizations even before the formation of a national
government."20 7 The World Bank may also enter a country with
no functioning government, provided no loans are involved, at
the request of the United Nations or other international bod-
ies. 218 IDA grants are also theoretically possible,20 9 although
they have not been implemented absent a functioning govern-
ment. Any World Bank action in the absence of a functioning
government, however, must be approved by the IBRD Executive
Board with all World Bank members represented, making it pro-
cedurally difficult.
The World Bank has used a variety of means to deal with
countries that are not yet members or that have no functioning
government. To address problems in Eritrea, the Bank loaned
money to Ethiopia, which in turn loaned the money to Eri-
trea.21 0 In the West Bank and Gaza, loans to a non-member were
justified on the basis that assistance was warranted "for the bene-
fit of members. ''211
Trust funds offer the most promising route to intervention
in non-members or nations without functioning governments. 212
The World Bank can manage a trust comprised of contributions
from member nations and disburse those funds without classifi-
206. See IMFArticles of Agreement, supra note 47, art. II, § 1-2.
207. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCrION, supra note 1, at 13.
208. Id. at 13.
209. Id. at 12-13.
210. Id. at 12.
211. Id. at 12 n.5. Bosnia and Herzegovina also received assistance, funded by the
Netherlands, prior to membership once its intention to become a member was known.
Id. at 13 n.6.
212. For a brief description of World Bank trust funds and how they are used, see
The World Bank Group, Trust Funds (visited Apr. 25, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.
org/html/extdr/faq/fal9755.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
[hereinafter IBRD Trust Funds].
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cation as a "Bank program." Thus, shareholder interests and
World Bank credit is not at stake, and if the trust fund pays for
its administrative costs, then it can be used to finance projects in
nations with whom the World Bank could not ordinarily deal. A
trust fund for the former Yugoslavia was used in this manner
during the period before Bosnia and Herzegovina became a
member.21 3
Although trust funds and other World Bank remedies do
not entirely cure the difficulty faced in states without stable gov-
ernments, they provide ways to obviate the traditional charter
restrictions. The ultimate limiting factor in World Bank involve-
ment in "stateless societies" is therefore the risk that they pose,
not the formal absence of a counterparty.
7. The Crisis of Emerging-World Debt
A final consideration for the World Bank in post-conflict in-
tervention, and one shared by all international financial institu-
tions, is the crisis of emerging-world debt. Many of the countries
emerging from conflict bear unwieldy amounts of debt to IFIs,
private lenders, and other nations. That debt frequently pre-
cedes conflict, worsens during war, and leaves a demolished na-
tion with unrealistic repayment obligations. The Framework cites
the problem and suggests that debt rescheduling is often neces-
sary in post-conflict countries, but it does not offer a thorough
discussion of the debt crisis.214
The statistics on debt are daunting. Between 1980 and
1995, the debt of nearly every developing nation increased sub-
stantially.21 5 Many nations must service an external debt that ex-
ceeds Gross National Product.2 16 Some of the most severely in-
debted countries include Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Sierra
Leone, Nicaragua, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and the Congo, most
of which have experienced some form of civil or international
213. Once Bosnia and Herzegovina stated an intention to become a member of
the Bank, additional funding for emergency reconstruction programs were drawn from
the Bank-administered Policy and Human Development Fund. THE WORLD BANK, AN-
NUAL REPORT 1997, at 126 (1997) [hereinafter IBRD ANNUAL REPORT 1997].
214. FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 9.
215. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A
CHANGING WORLD 246 (1997).
216. Id.
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conflict in recent years. 17
The debt crisis poses a major obstacle to World Bank post-
conflict intervention. If a nation has not cleared its arrears to
the IFIs and Paris and London Club creditors, it poses a height-
ened risk to the World Bank as its ability to repay loans is doubt-
ful. In such cases, the Bank often chooses not to participate un-
til a suitable workout and rescheduling of debt have occurred.
Even when debt is rescheduled, reconstruction programs add
further debt to borrowing nations. Loans are therefore not ideal
funding for many post-conflict initiatives.
The IBRD and IDA are both authorized to make direct
grants, 218 which are clearly of great preference to recipient na-
tions. When feasible, they should be preferentially applied to
post-conflict societies or others whose economic well-being is es-
sential to maintenance of the peace. The availability of grants is
limited,219 however, and they are consequently not a panacea for
the debt crisis. The IBRD and IDA most commonly use loan-
based financing for operations in post-conflict and other coun-
220tries.
Trust funds provide the most promising form of finance for
some highly-indebted countries. 22' The World Bank currently
operates over US$1 billion in trust funds, several of which have
contributed grants to post-conflict reconstruction efforts.2 22
Those funds combine the resources of the World Bank and do-
nor countries, primarily funding debt relief, technical assistance
217. In 1995, external debt as a percentage of GNP for some of the world's most
heavily indebted nations was as follows: Nicaragua (590%), Mozambique (444%),
Congo (366%), Guinea-Bissau (353%), and Angola (275%), and Ivory Coast (252%).
Id.
218. The IBRD Articles of Agreement do not provide for grants, but they have been
permitted through interpretation when they are drawn from net income. The IDA
likewise has no charter mandate for grants but has added them by special resolution.
See FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK RECOUNSTRUCTION, supra note 1, at 8 n.3.
219. The IBRD transferred over US$1 billion out of net income in 1997, including
a US$150 million transfer to the Trust Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a US$140
million transfer to the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank, and US$500 for the HIPC
Debt Initiative Trust Fund, discussed infta. See IBRD ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note
213, at 213-14. Nevertheless, such grants pale beside the US$106 billion of outstanding
Bank loans. Id. at 191.
220. Many post-conflict countries already have large outstanding loans from the
IBRD and the IDA. For a table that summarizes the Bank's outstanding loans to mem-
ber nations, see id. at 190-91.
221. See IBRD Trust Funds, supra note 212.
222. See IBRD ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 213, at 125-26.
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programs, and IBRD activities related to loan facilities. 23
One of the trust funds set up in 1997 was ajoint World Bank
and IMF fund to help relieve the debt of some of the world's
poorest nations. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Coun-
tries ("HIPC") is designed to alleviate debt burdens by distribut-
ing from the HIPC Trust Fund and the IDA grant window to
qualifying nations. 224  The HIPC program has recently been
used to grant US$3 billion of debt relief to Mozambique and
US$250 million to Mali, which became the seventh nation to
benefit from the HIPC.225 The HIPC has relieved over US$6 bil-lion of debt to date. 22 6 The HIPC initiative is an excellent start
to remedy the problem of emerging-world debt. It is important
to note, however, that the World Bank must devote more re-
sources to debt reduction if it is to attack the problem of debt in
post-conflict countries effectively. 2
27
B. Review of IMF Programs
As an agency without a specific legal mandate to carry out
reconstruction functions, the IMF does not have a charter-pre-
scribed role in post-conflict settings.228 Nevertheless, in October
1995, following the lead of the World Bank, the Executive Board
of the IMF approved a Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance pro-
gram to bolster the IMF's activity in postwar nations. 229 The pro-
gram, an extension of a previous emergency assistance program
223. Id. at 124.
224. Id. at 2; see Tony Addison, Ways to Make a Real Difference in Africa, INT'L HER-
ALD TRmB., Apr. 2, 1998, at 6. There are currently 41 nations classified as Heavily In-
debted Poor Countires ("HIPCs") under the program. However, any nation meeting
the program's eligibility criteria may receive assistance. To receive HIPC assistance, a
nation must: (1) be eligible for concessional assistance from the IMF and IBRD, (2)
face an unsustainable debt burden, and (3) establish a track record of sound reform
policies through IFI-supproted programs. See Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPCs) (visited Nov. 15, 1998) <http://ww.imf.org> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
225. See Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), supra note 224.
226. Id.
227. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stressed the importance of IFI debt
forgiveness programs as a means to build lasting peace. See Report by Annan Causes, Cures
of Africa Conflict, supra note 20.
228. For a discussion of the charter provisions of the IMF and its lack of mandate
for postwar reconstruction, see supra Part I.
229. International Monetary Fund, IMFInvolvement in Post-Conflict Countries (visited
April 2, 1998) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/confl.htm> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter IMF Post-Conflict Involvement].
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covering natural disasters, has made expedited financial support
available to post-conflict countries. °
The IMF Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance program is
designed to restore macroeconomic stability to a nation and to
catalyze balance-of-payments support from the international
community.231 To be eligible for the program, a country must
meet four qualifying conditions: there must be an urgent bal-
ance-of payments crisis, the country must have a highly disrupted
"institutional and administrative capacity," the country's authori-
ties must make a commitment of cooperation, and a concerted
international reconstruction effort must be underway.23 2 The fi-
nal criterion, that a concerted international effort be underway
before IMF involvement, displays the reluctance of the Fund to
take a leading initial role in reconstruction.
A country that meets the IMF criteria for emergency assist-
ance is first granted technical assistance and policy advice re-
garding issues of macroeconomic concern.233 In the second
phase of the program, financial support is provided via tradi-
tional IMF loan and credit facilities. Since its inception, the
Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance program has been employed
in six countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina,234 Rwanda,23 5 Alba-
230. In countries requiring urgent balance-of-payments support, the IMF has pro-
vided funds within six to 12 months after the cessation of conflict. Timing has hinged
upon several factors, such as the restoration of political stability, the formulation of an
appropriate economic program, the mobilization of donor support, and sometimes the
clearances of arrears by the host country. Id.
231. Id.
232. For a more detailed account of the criteria for assistance under the IMF's
Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance program, see IMF Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries
(visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.imf.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
233. Technical assistance has focused on fiscal, monetary, and exchange issues, as
well as the effective collection of economic statistics. Policy advice has concentrated
upon the preparation of sound budgets, quick-yielding revenue measures, and the es-
tablishment of sound monetary and exchange institutions. Id. All such assistance and
advice is vital to the restoration of economic growth and the efficacious use of external
aid.
234. On December 20, 1995, less than a week after signing the Dayton Peace Ac-
cords, Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded to the membership of the former Yugoslavia
in the IMF. On the same day, it became the first recipient of IMF emergency post-
conflict assistance, drawing approximately US$45 million to rebuild infrastructure and
further political and economic integration. The IMF program has provided technical
assistance in a number of areas, including the creation of a new central bank, fiscal
planning, and tax reform. Id.
235. Since April 1997, Rwanda has twice received IMF credits under the Emer-
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nia136 Tajikistan, 23 7 the Republic of Congo, 23  and most re-
cently, Sierra Leone.239
III. CONDITIONALITY
Conditionality programs are a second major means by
which IFIs can increase their influence in the peace-building
process. By making IFI financial assistance contingent on speci-
fied criteria, conditionality programs have used the substantial
leverage of the IFIs to bring about a wide range of economic,
legal, and other reforms. Traditionally, conditionality programs
have predominantly targeted economic policies that are deemed
essential for macroeconomic stability or economic growth.
Through the course of their history, however, IFI conditionality
has broadened to effect a wide range of social and legal reforms
gency Assistance program, totaling approximately US$20 million. IMF funds have been
applied to resettlement programs and economic rehabilitation. An IMF-coordinated
technical assistance program has also been instrumental in the resumption of activities
of the National Bank of Rwanda and has contributed to budgetary planning, gathering
of macroeconomic data, and revenue administration. IMF Gives Rwanda Credit, AFR.
NEws, Jan. 6, 1998; IMF Approves Second Loan for Rwanda, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1997, at
AO.
236. On November 7, 1997, the IMF approved an additional credit under the Post-
Conflict Emergency Assistance program, as Albania drew approximately US$12 million.
IMF Okays Emergency Post-Conflict Aid to Albania, XINHUA NEWS, Nov. 7, 1997. The princi-
pal goals of the program are to effect disinflation of the lek, to contain Albania's budget
deficit, and to resume economic growth. IMF advice has been instrumental in tax,
banking, and budgetary reforms necessary to realize those objectives. Albanian Lek Sta-
ble After Weathering the Worst, FX MANAGER, Oct. 10, 1997, at 7; IMF to Advance Emergency
Funds in Reforms Go Ahead, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 5, 1997.
237. Emergency assistance was granted to Tajikistan in December 1997 and again
in March 1998, as the IMF provided credits amounting to approximately US$20 million.
The credits were applied to Tajikistan's 1997-98 economic program, which tightened
fiscal and monetary policies to reduce inflation and to stabilize the currency. See IMF
Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries, supra note 232.
238. In July 1998, the IMF extended a credit of approxiamately US$10 million to
the Republic of Congo, supporting the government's 1998 economic program, which
seeks to restore national security and to prepare the Congo for implementation of
structural and administrative reform. See IMF Approves Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance
for the Republic of Congo (visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.imf.org> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
239. Sierra Leone became the most recent nation to qualify for IMF emergency
post-conflict assistance in November 1998. The program, which involves a credit of
approximately US$16 million, will be applied to restore fiscal imbalances and to restore
relations with creditors, preparing Sierra Leone for sustainable development plans in
1999. See IMF Approves Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance for the Republic of Sierra Leone
(visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.imf.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
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as well. If properly applied, conditionality has the potential to
function as an effective conflict-prevention measure, both before
and during U.N.-mediated peace operations.
In the post-Cold War era, IFI use of "peace conditionality"
has been increasingly advocated. "Peace conditionality" could
entail making IFI financial assistance contingent upon a govern-
ment's cooperation with its neighbors, compliance with interna-
tional directives, or maintenance of the peace. 4 ° U.N. Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan has advocated the use of "peace condi-
tionality, 2 41 as have numerous scholars242 and organizations
243
promoting international peace. Due largely to IFI reluctance to
take "political" action, however, peace conditionality has yet to
be widely implemented.
A. Origins
Conditionality began as a means to ensure the IMF's ability
to provide short-term revolving liquidity to its member states.24 4
Conditions were thus designed to guarantee timely repayment, a
factor perceived as critical for the success of the newly-created
monetary system. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods mon-
etary system in 1971, the IMF increasingly disbursed loans as a
240. The best example of "peace conditionality" to date occurred in Guatemala,
where in May 1997, IMF Director Michael Camdessus publicly declared that the princi-
pal requirement attached to financial assistance was the timely implementation of
peace accords signed in December 1996. Carbonnier, supra note 172, ch. 6.
241. See Report by Annan: Causes, Cures of Africa Conflict, supra note 20.
242. See, e.g., Robert Skidelsky & Edward Mortimer, Economic Sanctions as a Means to
International "Health," in STOPPING WARS BEFORE THEY START: PREVENTVE DIPLOMACY
154, 171 (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1996); Kevin M. Cahill, Introduction to STOPPING WARS
BEFORE THEY START: PREVENTIvE DIPLOMAcY 3, 13 (Kevin M. Cahill, ed., 1996) (refer-
ring to argument made by David Owen); Linarelli, supra note 11, at 269; Gilles Kepel &
Andrew Pierre, West Must Move to Stabilize War-Torn Algeria, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 18,
1996, at A15.
243. Both the Conflict Prevention Forum and the Carnegie Commission on the
Prevention of Deadly Conflict advocate the use of conditionality to achieve goals related
to the peace process. See, e.g., Conflict Prevention Forum, A Guide: Costs and Causes of
Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa: Conditionality/Incentives for Conflict Prevention (visited
Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolboxl0.htm> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal); Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Con-
flict, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http:/www.ccpdc.org/
pubs/diamond/dia95_04.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
244. IMF conditionality has been practiced since its early years, despite the fact
that conditionality was never agreed to at the Bretton Woods Conference. It was not
until 1969 that conditionality became embodied in the IMF Articles of Agreement. See
JOHN SPRAOS, IMF CONDITIONALITY. INEFFECTUAL, INEFFICIENT, MISTARGETED 3 (1986).
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form of development to poor countries, conditionality increas-
ingly became a tool for reducing general "country risk," and the
scope of IMF-targeted policies increased. In 1980, the World
Bank, also heavily immersed in developing-world activities, be-
gan to use conditionality programs as well, responding to acute
balance-of-payments crises in many of its borrowing countries.245
By the end of the Cold War, conditionality programs had ex-
panded beyond the protection of short-term liquidity to address
a wide range of economic, administrative, and arguably social
policies. 246 "Structural adjustment" via conditionality has be-
come a dominant theme in international development. 247
In principle, the IMF and World Bank do not exercise con-
ditionality in areas that they deem "political" because the World
Bank charter prohibits such involvement, as do historical poli-
cies of the IMF. For this reason, peace conditionality has yet to
be acknowledged as a tool in peace-building.248 Politics and eco-
nomics, however, cannot easily be separated in many emerging
nations, and IFI "economic" considerations often have profound
social and political impacts. 49 Similarly, political developments,
especially those that relate to peace, invariably have pronounced
effects on economic development. Therefore, with an expansive
definition of "economic considerations," IFI conditionality pro-
grams can enter the political and peace-building arenas.25°
B. Criticisms of the Practice
Although the power of conditionality programs is clear,
their effectiveness is widely disputed, especially in the context of
peace-building. Several major criticisms have been made of IFI
conditionality programs. First, many critics have argued that
245. See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank and "Governance" Issues in Its Borrow-
ing Members, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 53, 58 (Franziska Tschofen &
Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991). At present, the World Bank's use of conditionality is
functionally almost identical to that employed by the IMF. See Carreau, supra note 40,
at 1999-2000.
246. See Cahn, supra note 44, at 160; Shihata, supra note 245, at 59 (asserting that
"conditionality has thus evolved from macroeconomic measures to detailed reforms af-
fecting the public administration itself"); Orford, supra note 8, at 465; Singer, supra
note 25, at 5.
247. See Carreau, supra note 40, at 1996.
248. Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1, 19.
249. See Orford, supra note 8, at 459.
250. See Shihata, supra note 245, at 53.
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stringent IMF and IBRD-imposed economic policies tend to
destabilize emerging markets, leading to social and political up-
heaval, thus increasing the prospect of armed conflict.251  Sec-
ond, critics argue that conditionality is applied in a way that-
grossly oversteps the powers conferred in the IFI charters.252
Third, critics fault the IFIs for implementing programs without
proper regard for country conditions or consultation of local au-
thorities, amounting to a form of neo-colonial governance.253
Fourth, IFI programs are criticized as too rigid, failing to allow
for flexible application in changing economic and political set-
tings.2 4 Finally, statistics suggest that conditionality does not, in
fact, result in a reduction of credit risk for the Bretton Woods
institutions. 25  All of these factors have led emerging-world na-
tions to resent and lack confidence in conditionality programs,
which further impedes their effectiveness. Consequently, many
disfavor the introduction of peace conditionality, which would
represent an even greater extension of IFI influence in mem-
bers' domestic affairs.
The first major criticism is that conditionality programs are
too austere and actually destabilize emerging markets, economi-
cally and politically.256 In essence, those individuals opposed to
251. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
255. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
256. See Orford, supra note 8, at 443. Orford argues that IMF and World Bank
programs were significant contributing factors to the political'destabilization in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, thus contributing to the outbreak of war. See id. Part II; see, e.g., Andrew
J. Williams, Economic Intervention by International Economic Organizations in Central and
Eastern Europe: Will it Lead to More or Less "Security"for the Region?, in NEW FORMS OF
SECURITY, VIEWS FROM CENTRAL, EASTERN, AND WESTERN EUROPE 103, 109 (Pal Dunay et
al. eds., 1995); SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER
THE COLD WAR 51-52 (1995); James Petras & Steve Vieux, Bosnia and the Revival of U.S.
Hegemony, NEW LEFT REv., July/Aug. 1996, at 10; Daniel C. Milder, Foreign Assistance:
Catalyst for Domestic Coalition Building, in THE WORLD BANK: LENDING ON A GLOBAL
SCALE, ch. 6 (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1994).
For a contrary view, see SCOTT R. SIDELL, THE IMF AND THIRD-WORLD POLITICAL
INSTABILITY. Is THERE A CONNECT7ION? 71 (1988). Sidell conducted a study of the rela-
tionship between conditionality and political instability and argues that the apparent
association of the two variables can be explained by the "simultaneous existence of a
variety of long-term structural economic problems, which, in and of themselves, tend
to induce political instability." Id. Sidell argues that the media is somewhat responsible
for the negative portrayal of IFI conditionality because its failures are disproportion-
ately selected as newsworthy. Id.
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conditionality programs contend that the needs of emerging na-
tions, especially those on the brink of conflict, do not resound
with the frugal spending caps and counter-inflationary policies
forced upon them by IMF and World Bank structural adjustment
programs. 25 7 During fragile political periods, countries may
need to indebt themselves in order to generate rapid economic
growth and engender peace. In such situations, fiscal and mone-
tary austerity often increases poverty and political unrest.2 58
Austere conditionality programs can effect political
destabilization in two major ways. First, they can exacerbate eco-
nomic conditions, leading to deflationary pressure, reduced na-
tional income, and the threat of unemployment.2 59 Economic
frustration is inevitably related to popular confidence in and
support of government, and that support is vital during periods
in which there exists a threat to the peace. The second destabi-
lizing effect of conditionality occurs when it forces economi-
cally-driven legal reform without proper regard to national poli-
tics.260 Constitutional and political reform designed to solidify
long-term economic growth can upset ,delicate short-term polit-
ical balances.
The second major criticism of conditionality is that it repre-
sents an overstepping of the legal bounds set forth in the IFI
charters. Conditionality inheres somewhat in the nature of any
lending operation, but the Articles of Agreement of the World
Bank and IMF do not mandate the prescription of proper devel-
opment policies, legal or constitutional reform for borrowing na-
tions. 261 While the IFIs justify such intervention as economically
justified means to reduce credit risk, many borrowers believe the
257. Haider Ali Kahn argues that the World Bank and the IMF are competent to
deal with narrow issues of monetary and financial adjustment, but they lack an ability to
integrate that competence into the complex social setting of emerging-world nations.
Haider Ali Kahn, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 104 (Ved P. Nanda et al. eds., 1994). Consequently,
IFI policies often have a negative impact on the social condition of borrowing nations.
Id.
258. See Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 371 (1994).
259. Norman Girvan, Empowerment for Development: From Conditionality to Partnership,
in PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT: EFFECTIVE GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 23, 29 (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1995).
260. See Orford, supra note 8, at 456-57.
261. Singer, supra note 25, at 7.
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so-called "Washington Consensus '26 2 represents a transgression
of the IFIs' legal bounds, particularly with regard to their polit-
ical activity prohibitions.
The third major criticism of conditionality, related to that
above, has been the IFIs' perceived lack of concern for country
specificity and failure to consult with host governments. Critics
argue that profound differences between emerging economies
are not adequately reflected in IFI conditionality plans, which
assume a relatively standard, and often unrealistic,
macroeconomic framework for nations.263 In addition, the IFIs
are faulted for their failure to consult host governments, a fact
that has several negative repercussions. This failure to consult
host governments effectively disempowers national governments
to take part in their country's peace-building and developmental
process, a vital facet of a successful long-term program.2 6 4 More-
over, it reduces country specificity by failing to access an impor-
tant source of local expertise and human capital. 265 Finally, it
engenders significant resentment and leads to the frequent ac-
cusation that conditionality represents a modern form of first-
world extraterritorial governance.266
A fourth principal criticism of IFI conditionality programs
has been their rigidity.267 Although economic and political situ-
ations can change rapidly in unstable nations, critics contend
262. The "Washington Consensus" is a term used wryly to refer to the broad-reach-
ing policies imposed by IFIs. Id.
263. IFIs typically apply the so-called "neoclassical paradigm," which makes certain
assumptions about economic governance that arguably do not hold in many emerging-
world nations. See Girvan, supra note 259, at 29.
264. Id. at 30-31.
265. Id. at 24.
266. Jonathan Cahn asserts that "[t]he Bank holds that so long as governance is-
sues are related to economic development, the Bank may impose conditions on govern-
ance. Bank critics complain that this policy allows the Bank to impose its economic
agenda and political will on developing countries." Cahn, supra note 44, at 170. Condi-
tionality is often resented by borrowing nations as a form of neo-colonialism. See Car-
reau, supra note 40, at 1997-98; PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND
ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLIcY 24546 (1993). "Today much of the discussion about pol-
icy-based lending is subsumed under the new heading of 'governance'." Stremlau &
Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 3, 9. For a discussion of the concept of "good governance,"
under which the IFIs have advanced many of their conditionality programs in the
1990s, see generally id. ch. 3, 10-16.
267. IFI structural adjustment plans set rigorous and relatively inflexible
macroeconomic policies in order for nations to draw down IFI facilities. See STEPHAN III
ET AL., supra note 266, at 244-46; Brown, supra note 258, at 352.
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that the IFIs do not allow for adequate flexibility in their pro-
grams. As a result, it is difficult for member countries to react to
sudden developments without running afoul of their condition-
ality agreement. Stringent controls constrict a borrowing gov-
ernment and erode its capacity to manage the transition from
conflict to peace.26
A final criticism of conditionality is that it does not effec-
tively reduce the credit risk exposure to lending institutions.
Although it is difficult accurately to determine the validity of
such an argument, there is substantial evidence that IFI condi-
tionality programs have had a high rate of failure.269 The failure
of such programs can be largely attributed to the weaknesses dis-
cussed herein.
The result of the numerous problems with conditionality is
that conditionality does not, at present, represent an ideal tool
for the prevention of deadly conflict. Although the notion that
IFIs should use their leverage toward peace-building is sound,
the existing practice of conditionality is encumbered by too
much emerging-world doubt and resentment to be feasibly ad-
vanced as a tool for peace. A suggestion for the revamping of
conditionality, which would allow it to take on a greater function
in peace operations, is provided below, along with other key pro-
posals for IFI reform.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE GROWTH
As the foregoing discussions demonstrate, several obstacles
continue to impede effective IFI involvement in peace opera-
tions. In order to overcome those barriers, this Article suggests
several fundamental changes in IFI practice. First, the World
Bank, IDA, and regional development banks must overcome
their charter prohibitions on political involvement. Second, the
IFIs must arrive at a novel conception of "reconstruction," mov-
ing from their ingrained focus on development to embrace the
financial and operational requirements of post-conflict interven-
tion. Third, the IFIs must dispense with conditionality, replac-
268. See WOODWARD, supra note 256, at 379.
269. According to a 1987 report prepared by the World Bank's Operations Evalua-
tion Department, which performs audits of Bank-assisted projects, almost 60 percent of
Bank projects were reported to have "serious shortcomings" or to be "complete fail-
ures." See OPERATIONs EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, WORLD BANK, THE TWELFTH ANNUAL
REVIEW OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE RESULTS 1 1.16-1.19 (1987).
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ing it with a less onerous, more cooperative means of economic
and legal guidance. Finally, the IFIs must develop a lasting coop-
eration with the United Nations and other key agencies of the
peace process. By carrying out the foregoing proposals, the IFIs
would substantially improve their ability to provide timely, effec-
tive succor in international peace operations.
A. Amending the "Political" Activity Prohibition
One of the entrenched obstacles to IFI effectiveness in
peace operations is their unwillingness, based on interpretations
of their charters, to engage in activities deemed to be political.2 70
As discussed above, the political activity prohibitions have been
interpreted in a manner that impedes IFI involvement in early-
phase reconstruction and prevents the use of "peace conditional-
ity. '' 271 In order for IFIs to increase their effectiveness in both ex
ante and ex post peace-building measures, this legal obstacle to
political action must be removed.
In this regard, it is appropriate to focus upon Article IV,
§ 10 of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement, the "political
activity" provision that forms the template for similar prohibi-
tions in the charters of the regional development banks and the
IDA.272 Article IV, § 10 has also influenced the IMF, which has
no similar clause but remains apt to follow the IBRD's lead in
future peace involvement. Therefore, the "political activity" pro-
hibition represents the key legal barrier to IFI action in the
peace-building arena.
The ideal way to avoid the constrictions of Article IV, § 10
would be to amend the Bank's charter. Elimination or substitu-
tion of the provision would render the Bank more analogous to
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("EBRD"), a post-Cold War financial institution whose charter
explicitly authorizes some forms of political action, including the
use of conditionality to achieve explicitly political objectives. 273
270. See supra Part I.A.
271. Stremlau and Sagasti note that "the Bank still lacks a firm legal basis to guide
it in such undertakings." Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 1, 45.
272. Article IV, § 10 and the substantially identical charter provisions of the IDA
and regional development banks are discussed supra, in Part I.A.
273. Article 1 of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("EBRD") charter reads as follows: "In contributing to economic progress and recon-
struction, the purpose of the Bank shall be to foster the transition towards open market-
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Amending of the IBRD charter is possible but is not apt to occur
in the near future. The charter amendment process is lengthy
and would undoubtedly be subject to significant opposition.2 74
Thus, the more feasible alternative is a reinterpretation of the
existing "politcal activity" provision.2 75
The traditional Bank definition of "political action" must
become narrower for two reasons. First, a broad definition pre-
cludes effective action in the reconstruction sphere, thus con-
flicting with the explicit purpose set forth for the Bank in Article
1.276 Secondly, a broad definition inhibits the Bank from making
decisions based on valid economic concerns, which its Articles of
Agreement explicitly requires.2 7 7
In order to pursue reconstruction effectively, the World
Bank must become involved at an earl), stage in the peace pro-
cess, negotiating with key parties to formulate a timely and work-
able program for demining, demobilization, refugee resettle-
ment, and the rebuilding of vital infrastructure.278 If Article IV,
§ 10 is construed so as to preclude such involvement, its inter-
pretation creates an internal incongruity in the Bank's charter.
The Bank is also specifically entitled to use "economic" fac-
tors in implementing policies such as conditionality arrange-
ments. It is clear that sustainable peace is a monumental eco-
oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of mul-
tiparty democracy, pluralism, and market economics." Agreement Establishing the Eu-
ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, reprinted in IBRAHiM F.I. SHIHATA,
THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 109 (1990).
The EBRD is explicitly permitted to use conditionality as a means to promote de-
mocracy and related political goals. SeeJohn Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 376-77
(1995). It therefore has the ability to participate much more directly in peace opera-
tions. See Linarelli, supra note 11, at 280.
274. Interview with Abram Chayes, Professor, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge,
Mass. (Apr. 22, 1998).
275. As early as 1990, IBRD General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata acknowledged that
the terms "political affairs," "political character," and "economic considerations" were
legally nebulous and that executive Bank directors had the power to interpret them.
Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 3, 11.
276. For a discussion of Article I and the Bank's mandate for reconstruction, see
supra Part I.A.
277. The IBRD charter explicitly requires that "[iln making or guaranteeing a
loan, the Bank shall pay due regard to the prospects that the borrower... will be in
position to meet its obligations under the loan." IBRD Articles of Agreement, art. III,
§ 4(v).
278. See Ball, supra note 152.
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nomic concern in many nations in which the Bank operates.27 9
Risks associated with political and military instability must there-
fore be addressable as economic concerns.28 ° In fact, the IFIs
already do so, intruding heavily into the social and political
spheres of many emerging nations.28 1 As a result, one of the
most frequent criticisms of the Bank and the IMF is that they
intrude into legal and political affairs under the guise of eco-
nomic considerations. 28 2
That perceived guise has engendered distrust of IFIs, whose
"economic" programs are often not taken as literal statements of
their objectives. To acknowledge that some forms of political
and legal intervention are valid as "economic considerations"
would remove the guise and subject IFI programs to more ap-
propriate levels of international accountability. The dearth of
present accountability and transparency is another facet of IFI
operations commonly criticized at present-it lowers both rap-
port and effectiveness. 283
Thus, the definition of "political" used by the World Bank,
its subsidiaries, and the IMF should preclude neither the means
of effective reconstruction nor the IFIs' ability to address impor-
tant economic considerations in an open and accountable man-
ner. Although salient justifications for such a broad reading ex-
isted during the years of a bipolar political world, those justifica-
tions have lost their persuasiveness in the new geopolitical
framework. A broad reading of "political" forces the IFIs to
choose between two unfavorable alternatives: masking political
considerations or ignoring them. The former brings disrepute
to the organizations and diminishes their credibility in the inter-
national arena, especially among the nations of the emerging
world. The latter results in inadequate programs for nations
whose political fragility is the dominant source of its
macroeconomic risk.
A precise definition of "political" is difficult to propose, as
279. "Political stability has always been recognized as an important precondition
for economic development." Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 3, 1.
280. See id. ch. 1, 43.
281. Id. ch. 1, 7, 19.
282. Carbonier, supra note 172, ch. 6.
283. IMF Director Michael Camdessus has acknowledged the importance of in-
creasing transparency of IFI policies, asserting that transparency is the "top priority" at
both national and international levels. Micchael Camdessus, The IMF and Its Critics,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1998.
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some restraint on IFI intervention is clearly valid. The definition
should be operational, allowing for IFI participation in the en-
deavors prescribed herein. It is difficult however, to foresee
what the proper scope of IFI action should be in many nations.
Promotion of democracy may be fairly construed as a rightful
economic consideration, but promoting the election of a partic-
ular candidate almost certainly constitutes excessive political in-
tervention. Requiring nations to cooperate with regional peace
accords may be reasonable, but demanding reform of certain so-
cial programs may not.
Ultimately, the best means to arrive at a definition is not
through solitary academic reflection but through practice. In-
creasing the transparency and accountability of IFI programs, es-
pecially those in the peace-building context, will draw much-
needed attention to the decisions made by the World Bank, the
Fund, and others. That attention will result in the type of inter-
national debate and discussion necessary to achieve a more re-
fined definition of "political."
B. Reconsidering Roles in Reconstruction
The second major change in IFI policy and practice must be
a greater acceptance of their role in reconstruction. 214 Again,
the World Bank should take the lead in reform, as it is the only
IFI with a specific mandate as a reconstruction agency. Bank ac-
tion will likely be followed to varying degrees by regional devel-
opment organizations, the IDA, and the IMF.
As discussed above, one of the World Bank's deepest obsta-
cles to effectiveness in reconstruction is its insistence on the pri-
macy of its development mandate. 285 The Framework initiative
highlights the Bank's improvement in the reconstruction field,
but it adheres too tightly to the Bank's traditional self-perception
as a development agency, an historically-based self-perception
that is unsupported by the Bank's Articles of Agreement and by
the demands of the post-Cold War world. 8 6
284. Stremlau and Sagasti write: "the original vision of the founders of the Bretton
Woods institutions should not be forgotten . . . keeping this original purpose in mind
will be important as the [World Bank] broadens its role." Stremlau & Sagasti, supra
note 3, ch. 1, 17.
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. Nicole Ball argues that there is "an urgent need for a paradigm shift within
the development community to take account of the special conditions that exist follow-
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As discussed in Part II above, the World Bank's proper ac-
ceptance of its dual role as a development and reconstruction
agency will require deep institutional reform and the support of
the IBRD's major shareholders.287 It will require that the Bank
adopt an institutional base for reconstruction, developing the
expertise, field presence, and operational procedures necessary
to respond quickly to early-phase reconstruction needs.288 It will
also demand a reconception of the Bank's traditional financial
priorities and a greater acceptance of the inherent risks of re-
construction. 28 9 Finally, the Bank must form stronger alliances
with relief agencies, host governments, other IFIs, and the U.N.
apparatus. 290
To be certain, the proposals enumerated in Part II of this
Article will be extremely costly, even for an large financial insti-
tution such as the World Bank. If the Bank does not take an
effective lead in the reconstruction process and adapt to the new
geopolitical order however, it is unlikely that any organization
will.
2 9 1
C. Replacing Conditionality with "Partnerships"
The reform or replacement of conditionality programs is
another essential IFI step to more effective peace-building opera-
tions. As discussed above, existing conditionality programs have
been highly criticized and dubiously effective.2 92 They have
been too austere and too inflexible, failing to allow borrowing
nations the fiscal flexibility often demanded in the peace-build-
293 haing process. They have also failed to incorporate sufficient
participation from borrowing countries. As a result, they have
engendered frustration with the international financial appara-
ing civil wars." Nicole Ball, Lessons for the International Community in War-to-Peace Transi-
tions, Remarks to the Opening Session reproduced in NICOLE BALL & TIMOTIV HALEVY, MAK-
ING PEACE WORK: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (1996).
287. Carbonnier, supra note 172, ch. 6; Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 2, 4,
5.
288. See supra Part II.A.2-4.
289. See supra Part II.A.5-7.
290. See infra Part IV.D.
291. "[I]f the UN family, which includes the World Bank at its outer edges, does
not set about helping these countries, nobody will." Reworking the U.N., supra note 14, at
18.
292. See supra Part III.B.
293. Carbonnier asserts that "economic adjustment is often in contradiction with
political adjustment toward peace." Carbonnier, supra note 172, ch. 3, 1.
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tus and are viewed as troublesome prospective additions to
peace-building. 294
Effective IFI peace-building and development requires that
conditionality be replaced by a more flexible, realistic, par-
ticipatory, and country-specific practice. 295 It is not enough for
the IFIs to make alterations to "conditionality": the entire prac-
tice should be revamped and renamed to escape the negative
associations that it carries. The new concept should be more
akin to "partnership," under which both IFIs and borrowing na-
tions actively participate, sharing in responsibilities and re-
wards.2 9 6
"Partnership" plans would include detailed advice and set
goals for borrowing nations, and a standard of good-faith efforts
toward those goals would be relevant in determining future ac-
cess to financing facilities. Goals would be set cooperatively be-
tween IFI representatives and national leaders, resulting in poli-
cies more accurately tailored to recipient nations.2 9 7 There is
little doubt that post-conflict countires will be receptive to sound
IFI advice, which can be extremely instrumental. What they
would resent is the continued unilateral imposition of that ad-
vice due to unequal financial bargaining power.
IFI "partnership" programs would still have a conditional el-
ement, which is necessary at some level to insure repayment of
loans.298 The conditions of assistance however, would be tied
more to an evaluation of a nation's efforts and less to its achieve-
ment of specified numerical goals. This more flexible approach
294. Stremlau and Sagasti assert that many borrowing states come to resent IFI
intervention and cease to cooperate fully, citing lack of capacity for failure to observe
agreements or repay loans. Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 3, 3.
295. Henry Kissinger has criticized IMF conditionality practice, suggesting that it
too often compounds political instability and weakens political structures in troubled
nations by forcing rigid and overly ambitious reforms on them. Henry Kissinger, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 1998.
296. The notion of replacing conditionality with "partnerships" is advanced by
Norman Girvan as a means to empower developing nations. See generally Girvan, supra
note 259, at 23-35.
297. Carbonnier, in his review of peace-building literature, asserts: "one of the
most important findings relates to the necessity of adapting aid and its delivery to local
circumstances and of involving domestic actors in the design and distribution of exter-
nally-funded assistance, with a strong emphasis on the strengthening of local capaci-
ties." Carbonnier, supra note 172, ch. 6.
298. Clearly, a balance must be achieved between, program flexibility and the legit-
imate need to ensure repayment of loans. See id.; see also Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note
3, ch. 1, 43.
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would enable borrowing nations to adapt to country changes
and to take a greater role in the peace-building or development
process. 299 As a result, countries would be more apt to view their
relations with IFIs as constructive, and an increase in confidence
and political support would enhance program effectiveness.
"Partnerships" would not eliminate the ex ante peace-build-
ing function captured in the idea of "peace conditionality." As
stated above, conditions of assistance would be tied less to nu-
merical goals and more to general government behavior. Thus,
adherence to peace accords, respect for human rights, and other
political factors that bear on peace-building could rightfully be
considerations in further financing arrangements. In such man-
ner, the essence of "peace conditionality" would survive the crea-
tion of more flexible overall "partnerships."
The country-specificity, flexibility, and increased participa-
tion of "partnership" programs would increase the overall rate of
IFI successes, thus ensuring more timely and reliable repayment,
the ultimate stated goal of conditionality programs. Although
internal bureaucratic resistance in IFIs may initially be strong,
and although some donor nations may be loath to relinquish the
"neo-colonial" influence currently exercised by the Bretton
Woods institutions, the substitution of "partnerships" for condi-
tionality programs would drastically enhance IFI efficiency, both
in peace-building and development.
D. Enhancing Inter-Agency Coordination
The final major reform demanded of IFIs in the peace-
building process is an enhanced cooperation with the United
Nations, its constituent organs, and other agencies involved in
the peace process."° Too often, IFI and U.N. leaders have failed
to consult one another and implemented conflicting policies,
each thwarting the other's effort to build sustainable peace.3"'
299. Carbonnier, supra note 172, ch. 6.
300. Enhanced inter-agency cooperation is increasingly viewed as central to suc-
cessful peace-building efforts. See generally BALL & HALEW, supra note 286, at 81-102;
Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 4, 1.
301. See Alvaro de Soto & Graciana del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, FOR.
POL'Y, Mar. 22, 1994, at 69 (focusing upon detrimental effect of conflicting U.N. and
IFI policies in El Salvador); see also Louis J. Ross, International Financial Institutions' Re-
sponse to Crises: Are International Institutions Doing Their Job? 90 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROC.
428, 431, 441 (1996) (emphasizing general importance of coordination in peace opera-
tions and related international crises).
BRETTON WOODS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
To advance the peace properly, international efforts must be
synergistic, not mutually inhibiting.10 2
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recurrently asserted
the importance of cooperation between the IFIs and the United
Nations, 30 3 and progress has been made. On April 20, 1998, a
high-level conference between leaders of the U.N. Economic
and Social Council, Mr. Annan, and executives from the Bretton
Woods institutions was held to discuss greater inter-agency col-
laboration on matters of peace-building and development. 04
The recently-implemented US$25 billion U.N.-IFI program 5 to
support the needs of post-conflict African nations is evidence
that the need for cooperation is being taken seriously. IFI coor-
dination with regional organizations has also improved. The Eu-
ropean Commission30 6 and Organization for African Unity30 7
have worked with the World Bank to alleviate post-war crises in
the former Yugoslavia and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. Fi-
nally, in 1997, the Development Assistance Committee of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") issued a set of guidelines for international coopera-
tion in the peace-building context. 308 The guidelines, which
were produced by representatives of the World Bank, the IMF,
the UNDP, the European Commission, and eighteen OECD na-
302. Id.; see Deputy Secretaiy-General Stresses Role of Post-Conflict Peace-Building, M2
PRESSWRE, May 13, 1998.
303. See, e.g., Report by Annan Explores Causes, Cures of Africa Conflict, supra note 20.
304. Closer Cooperation Between UN and Bretton Woods Institutions Is Imperative, M2
PREsswiRE, Apr. 20, 1998. Francesco Paolo Fulci, acting president of the U.N. Eco-
nomic and Social Council, voiced the hope that "this isjust the beginning of a regular
dialogue between members of the United Nations and of the Bretton Woods institu-
tions." Id. Kofi Annan spoke, emphasizing the mutual support between the United
Nations and IFIs in the peace-building context. Id.
305. See supra note 14.
306. See Commission Presents Commission/World Bank Partnership Results, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Nov. 19, 1996 (describing coordination between World Bank
and European Commission in implementing US$5.1 billion reconstruction program in
Bosnia).
307. See Gihon Hagos, World Bank to Enhance Cooperation with O.A.U., AFR. NEWS
SERVICE, Jan. 26, 1998.
308. The guidelines have six broad topics: (1) analysis of the links between con-
flict and development, (2) coordination within the international community and with
the nation at war, (3) the transition from humanitarian relief to development, (4)
building foundations for good governance, (5) post-conflict operations, and (6) re-
gional approaches to reconstruction and peace-building. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
COMMITTEE OF THE OECD, DAC GUIDELINES ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT
CO-OPERATION (1997).
1998]
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tions, represent a laudable effort but have yet to be effectively
implemented. °9
While the IFIs have begun the process of improved coordi-
nation, much more is clearly needed. The problems of overlap-
ping mandates, donor coordination, operational efficiency on
the ground, improved expertise, and myriad other aspects of the
peace-building process depend on dialogue between institutions
and the development of collective policies. 310 The type of meet-
ings held between the Bretton Woods institutions and the
United Nations, European Commission, and Organization for
African Unity should be generalized to a much wider range of
important participants including NGOs, relief agencies, and bi-
lateral support groups. Only by so doing will the IFIs realize
their potential as effective leaders in international peace opera-
tions of the coming century.
309. For a fuller description and discussion of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development's "DAC Guidelines," see generally Stremlau & Sagasti,
supra note 3, ch. 6.
310. See Deputy Secretary-General Stresses Role of Post-Conflict Peace-Building, supra note
302; Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 3, ch. 2, 14.
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